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When Japan experienced high economic growth, its society was 
characterized by low inequality in income, a high saving rate and a low 
consumption rate. However, after Japan’s transition to slow economic growth, 
it was said that the society lost income mobility, and the inequality among 
households deteriorated. In addition, the aggregate household saving rate 
dropped drastically. Meanwhile, consumption expanded, which gave people 
more options regarding their expenditure. With this background, this thesis 
examines the impacts of these changes-- income mobility over time, savings 
rate changes, and intra-household allocation--using a long run panel data set 
for Japan.  
Chapter 1 studies income mobility in Japanese society. Household 
income mobility at the macro level is measured by six different methods. The 
results show that as a whole, household income mobility became lower in the 
long-run. At the micro level, unconditional micro income mobility indicated that 
it is possible that poorer people would catch up with richer people. Finally, 
conditional micro income mobility also shows that there exists conditional 
convergence.  
In Chapter 2, the causes for the decrease in the aggregate household 
saving are analyzed. The aggregate time series analysis reveals that the 
increase in the ratio of the aged population ratio partially explains the sharp 
decrease in the household saving rate. By using household level panel data, it 
  
was found that savings driven by the motive of home ownership could partly 
account for this decrease in the saving rate. The increasing burden of 
education expenditure is among the strongest candidates for explaining the 
change. Finally, some weak indirect evidence in support of the target saving 
hypothesis is found.  
In Chapter 3, the characteristics of intra-household allocation are 
discussed. Using the Slutsky symmetry test, the unitary model could not be 
rejected for the consumption behavior of one-person households. Meanwhile, 
the tests for SR1, distribution factor proportionality and linearity indicated that 
the collective model might explain the consumption behavior of two-person 
households. Finally, the hypothesis that three-person households could be 
represented by the collective model for two-person households could not be 
rejected. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INCOME MOBILITY IN JAPAN 
 
1. Introduction  
Japan experienced its highest economic growth rate in the 1960s, 
allowing the country to establish a more egalitarian. Most people in Japan 
considered that they belonged to the middle-income class, and in fact they did. 
The bottom 10th percentile of earners accounted for 2.3 percent of the 
national capacity in Japan, whereas in the U.S. the bottom 10 percent 
accounted for only 1.0 percent of the nation’s wealth. According to the OECD, 
at the beginning of the 1980s, Japan was one of the most equalized societies 
among developed countries. 
However, this situation started to change in the early 1980s. Japan 
experienced a bubble economy, where housing and land prices increased at 
an unprecedented pace. Instead of saving their income in bank accounts, 
people started to invest their money in property or land. As a result, the real 
estate prices accelerated drastically although the prices of goods did not climb 
so much. This frantic economic activity came to an end at the end of the 1980s, 
and was followed by what became known as the “ten lost years”. In the 1990s, 
the Japanese economy experienced a long recession and suffered from high 
unemployment and low GDP growth. 
The Japanese government tried to bring the economy out of recession, 
to create more job opportunities, and to reform the financial industry, using 
labor policies as well as monetary and fiscal policies. As a result, the structure 
of the labor market has changed and at present lifetime employment is no 
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longer the norm. Since the middle of 1900’s, private banks have been required 
to establish more rigorous standards for lending money and to maintain higher 
amounts of capital. At the same time, the stock market has been made more 
open, and more and more companies depend on stock or bonds issues to 
raise capital for investment. This has strengthened the large size export-
oriented companies because they can obtain capital from foreign investors on 
the stock market. On the other hand, medium and small size companies have 
found it difficult to gather capital because they mostly depend on private banks 
for their investment. This causes the wage gap between employees at large 
companies and those at medium and small companies to widen. 
At the same time, the country’s demographic structure and people’s 
lifestyles are also changing; the ratio of the elderly to the working population 
has been increasing, whereas the number of children has been decreasing. In 
terms of lifestyle, aging parents used to live together with their adult children 
and the generations took care of each other. For example, elderly parents 
were in charge of household chores and the adult children worked outside the 
home. Now, many elderly people live separately from their children and form 
their own independent households. This also has an effect on income 
inequality. Previous studies reveal that the difference in income among old 
generations is larger than the difference among young generations. Therefore, 
the fact that the number of households, only consisting of elderly people, goes 
up might raise the inequality in the society although the social structure does 
not change.  
In fact, under these socio-economic conditions, the income disparity 
between the rich and the poor has increased, as indicated by an increase in 
Japan’s Gini coefficient. Now this coefficient’s value is ranked in the middle of 
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OECD countries, proving Japan does not have the most equal society any 
longer. Some empirical studies have investigated the relation between 
enlarged income disparity and some specific economic phenomena in Japan. 
Ohtake and Saito (1998) investigated this inequality and its causes, using the 
consumption inequality method. They analyzed how consumption inequality 
within a fixed cohort grows with age, using Japanese household micro data. 
Following the method developed by Deaton and Paxson (1994), they obtained 
the following conclusions. First, consumption inequality starts to increase at 
the age of 40. Second, younger generations face a more unequal distribution 
from the beginning of their life-cycle. Third, a half of the rapid increase in the 
economy-wide consumption inequality during the 1980s was caused by 
population aging.  
Their study on inequality in Japanese society used cross-section data. 
These data showed the inequality at specific points, but they did not show the 
dynamics of inequality in Japan because the sample households change from 
one survey to another. However, if there is high income mobility in a society, 
inequality does not necessarily worsen even though the Gini coefficient rises 
(Fields 2007). This is because at any single point in time, a household may 
belong to the lowest 10th percentile group but at another point, it might be 
included in the highest 10th percentile due to changes in their socio-economic 
circumstances. If so, in terms of lifetime income, the overall inequality in the 
society does not become worse at all. Thus, income mobility should be more 
carefully examined and the dynamic aspect of the inequality in Japan should 
be explored. Now that inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is 
increasing, if income mobility is not observed, then the situation is likely to 
serious. 
 4 
In this paper, income mobility in Japan is investigated both by macro 
and micro measurements using panel data. Section 2 explains the different 
measurements and section 3 describes the data set. As is often the case with 
panel data, this data set also has a certain amount of attrition and the attrition 
bias is also inspected in this section. Section 4 and 5 examine the results of 
income mobility measured by macro and micro analysis respectively. Finally, 
section 6 states the conclusion and policy implications based on those 
conclusions.   
 
2. Methods to Measure Income Mobility 
 One agreed definition of income mobility is “how much income each 
recipient receives at two or more points in time” (Fields 2007). Other than this 
point, income mobility means different things for different people. There are 
three issues that help determine which kind of mobility analysis is dealt with; 
intergenerational versus intragenerational, changes in the distribution of what 
among whom, and macro-mobility versus micro-mobility.  
The first issue in this topic refers to the aspect of income mobility is 
intergenerational or intragenerational. In this paper, income mobility is 
analyzed in the intragenerational context only because of the limitation in data. 
For the second issue, an indicator of social or economic status and the choice 
of recipient unit must be fixed. This research deals with mobility of income per 
capita among households. Third, the mobility questions are categorized into 
two groups; macro and micro. Macro-mobility studies research on the degree 
of economic mobility there is. On the other hand, micro-mobility studies 
research on what determines the income changes of individual households. 
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This paper analyzes both macro and micro-mobility and in this section, the 
measurements this paper adopts is explained. 
      
2.1 Macro Income Mobility 
There are many different ways to measure macro mobility. Most 
previous papers, such as Hungerford (1993), Gittleman and Joyce (1995, 
1996), Sawhill and Condon (1992), Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin, and Rhody 
(1997), Buchinsky and Hunt (1996), and Gottschalk and Huynh (2006), 
describe just one or two mobility concepts, which vary from study to study. 
However, Buchinsky et al. (2003) and Fields (2007) examine six concepts of 
mobility that have been used in the literature. There is no single best measure 
of macro mobility. One concept or measure of macro mobility is not 
necessarily more important than any other for understanding the amount of 
mobility taking place in a country over time. Each concept measures 
something quite different, and it is important to look at all of them to gain a 
more complete understanding of how much mobility there is in any given year 
and how the amount of mobility has changed over time. 
This paper uses the six different measurements explained by Fields 
(2007) although some of them have been adjusted to become more suitable 
for our data set. The following notation is used in this section. 
  
),,( 1 nxxx = = vector of incomes in an initial year 
),,( 1 nyyy = = ordered vector in a subsequent year 
),( yxM = extent of mobility associated with the transformation yx→  
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In Fields’ index, mobility towards equality depends on the relations 
between inequality of average income to inequality of initial income: if average 
income is distributed more equally than initial income, mobility is judged to 
have equalized longer-term income relative to initial income. 
More recently, interest in mobility has attained a wider scope and is not 
only interested in gauging the distributional impact of income changes, but 
also the nature and origin of the changes in economic well-being. As Fields 
(2001) puts it: “Economic mobility studies are concerned with quantifying the 
movement of given recipient units through the distribution of economic well-
being over time, establishing how dependent one’s current economic position 
is on one’s past position, and relating people’s mobility experiences to various 
influences.” Changes in economic well-being can be interpreted and thus 
measured in a wide variety of ways. Fields categorizes these different 
interpretations into six notions of mobility (in addition to mobility towards 
equality): time dependence, positional movement, share movement, non-
directional income movement, directional income movement, and mobility as 
an equalizer of long-term incomes.  
 
(1) Mobility as Time Dependence  
Mobility as time dependence refers to the extent to which an individual’s 
current economic well-being is determined by his or her economic well-being 
in the past. In an intragenerational context, the final income of mobility is 
explained by his or her own base income. Time dependence is gauged by 
measures of association such as Cramer’s V or Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )ii
ii
yVarxVar
yxCovyxM ,1,1 −=  
 
In this case, the farther from zero the measurement between the initial 
income ix  and the final income iy , the more mobility-as-time-dependence 
there is.  
  
(2) Positional Movement 
Positional movement is defined as the movement of individuals among 
ranked positions in the income distribution. People experience positional 
movement only if they change ranks. A greater value in positional movement 
implies a greater number of movements by individuals and/or a wider actual 
move in the ranking by individuals.  
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
−
=
n
i
ii
n
xPyP
yxM
1
2 ,  
 
where ( )iyP = the percentile of individual i  in a subsequent year, ( )ixP = the 
percentile of individual i  in an initial year, and n  is the number of observations.  
 
(3) Share Movement 
 Share movement takes place if and only if a household income per 
capita rises or falls relative to the mean. This movement reflects the frequency 
and magnitude of these household share changes. One advantage of share 
movement is the mean absolute value of share changes;  
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where ( )xµ  and ( )yµ  are the means of the distributions x  and y  respectively. 
 
(4) Non-directional Income Movement 
 Non-directional income movement gauges the extent of fluctuation in a 
household income.  
 
( ) ∑
=
−=
n
i
ii xyn
yxM
1
4 loglog
1,  
 
(5) Directional Income Movement 
 Directional income movement refers to the direction of the income 
change as well as the amounts. This measurement may be judged using a 
concave valuation function as follows. 
  
( ) ( )∑
=
−=
n
i
ii xyn
yxM
1
5 loglog
1,  
 
(6) Mobility as an Equalizer of Long-term Incomes 
 This mobility considers how the income changes experienced by 
households cause the inequality of longer-term incomes to differ from the 
inequality of base-year incomes. Fields (2005) proposed the following 
measure. 
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( ) ( )( )xIaIM −≡ 16 , 
 
where x  = the vector of base-year incomes, y  = the vector of final-year 
incomes, a  is the vector of average incomes, the i ’th element of which is 
2/)( iyixia +≡ , and ( ).I  = a cross-sectional inequality measure such as the 
Gini coefficient or the Theil index. In this paper the Gini coefficient is adopted. 
 
In section 4, the one-year, three-year, and eleven-year macro-mobility is 
calculated using these six different measurements.  
 
2.2 Micro Income Mobility 
As previously mentioned micro-mobility analyzes which households 
have larger income changes than others and what are the determinants of 
these changes. In particular, economists have focused on estimating two 
types of mobility, unconditional and conditional mobility (Fields 2006). To 
begin answering the question of how income mobility has changed over 13 
years, first a mobility profile is presented. This profile shows the mean and 
standard deviation of one-year household income changes for different 
subgroups of individuals. These statistics for individuals are broken down by 
initial earnings quartile, age, education and parent’s income level. Then 
bivariate and multivariate regression models are used to study the correlations 
between earnings changes and each variable while holding the other variables 
constant. The regression model in this study specifies household income per 
capita changes as a function of initial earnings in stages and a linear function 
of age, education, and parent’s income level. This mobility is not interpreted as 
a causal model of earnings changes, but rather a way of answering the 
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question of which individuals experience the most positive earnings changes, 
holding other things equal.  
 
2.2.1 Unconditional Mobility 
Unconditional mobility is used to estimate to what extent there is 
convergence between the incomes of rich and poor households over time.  
Traditionally, questions of unconditional mobility have been answered 
by focusing on the bivariate relationship between income changes and initial 
income. In particular, many studies have estimated a model in which the 
income change of household i  at time t , tiY ,∆ , depends linearly on lagged 
income 1, −tiY , i.e., 
  
tititi uYY ,1,, ++=∆ −βα  
 
The parameter β  in this model measures the extent to which 
unconditional convergence occurs. If β <0 convergence is said to exist, if β >0 
divergence is said to exist between the rich and the poor, and if β =0 earnings 
change is unaffected by initial earnings. 
This convergence can be affected by many factors such as human 
capital characteristics of the individuals, local market conditions, aggregate 
economic shocks, state dependence, and so forth. However, the main goal of 
unconditional mobility studies is not to explore these factors, but rather start by 
documenting whether this convergence process has taken place or not. 
Documenting this process is relevant because if there is convergence 
between the incomes of initially rich and initially poor households, this would 
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equalize the long term distribution of income, and it would be indicative of the 
possibility for equality of opportunity in a society. 
 
2.2.2 Conditional Mobility 
Studies of conditional mobility estimate the convergence of incomes to 
a conditional mean. In other words, the presence of conditional convergence 
means that household incomes are converging to their predicted household 
level. This predicted level is usually determined by a set of observable and 
unobservable characteristics like gender, age, education level, ability, and so 
forth. 
In practice, many conditional mobility studies have estimated linear 
models where income mobility depends on initial income, and on a set of 
observable time-varying characteristics tiX ,  and time-invariant characteristics 
iZ , 
 
tiitititi ZXYY ,3,21,1, εβββα ++∆++=∆ −  
 
If there are a large number of observations for each individual over time, 
the estimation of this equation could control the effect of unobserved fixed 
characteristics, as in the literature on dynamic panel models. 
In the case of this equation, the coefficient 1β  estimates whether 
mobility is strongly conditionally convergent. If 1β <0, there is strong 
conditional convergence; if 1β  >0, there is strong conditional divergence; and 
if 1β = 0, the pattern of income change is neutral with respect to initial income, 
which means income recipients in different parts of the initial income 
distribution gain the same amount in yen. 
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Estimating this equation, or some modified version of it, is of interest 
mainly because it can help us elucidate the underlying determinants of income 
change. In particular, it can estimate the impact of socioeconomic 
characteristics such as education, age, gender, or sector of employment on 
mobility, conditional to the initial income level. Also, if the number of 
observations for each household is moderately large it can help us determine 
if the impact of lagged income on mobility is due to situation dependence, to 
some unobserved ability, or some other possible factor. 
It is important to remark that in both micro-mobility equations, income 
can be measured in currency units or in logarithms. However, the 
interpretation of the parameters is different in the two cases. In particular, 
taking logarithms of income gives less weight to the income changes of richer 
individuals and a higher weight to the income changes of poorer individuals. 
Also, the logarithmic transformation approximates proportionate changes 
instead of changes in currency units. 
 
3. Data 
The Institution for Research on Household Economics (IRHE) has 
designed, implemented and analyzed the Japanese Panel Survey of 
Consumers (JPSC) with a focus on changing lifestyles. This employs the 
panel research method to track the same individuals over multiple periods of 
time. Cohort A consists of a group of young women aged between 24 and 34 
who were selected from across Japan in 1993 for an in-home questionnaire 
survey. Cohort B, consisting of women aged between 24 and 27, and cohort C, 
consisting of women aged between 24 and 29, were added respectively in 
1997 and 2003. The IRHE selected sampling points by two-stage stratified 
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random sampling. Then, they chose samples by systematic sampling using 
the registered address records until enough number of samples was collected. 
The relatively high response rate of this annual survey has overcome the 
inherent disadvantages of a panel survey. The IRHE have designed, 
implemented and analyzed this research project with a focus on changing 
lifestyles. Many of the people selected as participants in the study are at an 
age where their previously similar lifestyle paths begin to branch out and 
diversify. The objective of this study has been to identify various factors and 
problems associated with these changes and differences in the lifestyles of the 
study participants.  
As is often the case with panel data, JPSC also has a problem with 
attrition. Cohort A had a sample size of 1,500 when the survey started in 1993. 
After 13 years, 904 remained and had 596 dropped out. The rate of drop in the 
thirteen years is 39.7%. This was not especially bad compared with other 
panel data such as the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), 
but it is still necessary to check for attrition bias. Cohort B was added in 1997 
and the original sample had 500 but decreased to 292 in 2005, which means 
41.6% of the total samples dropped out. Cohort C had 836 samples, but the 
number fell to 674 in 2005.  As only three years passed since Cohort C was 
added, a relatively small portion of the samples, 19.4%, had dropped.  
There are two methods used to check attrition bias. One is to compare 
the mean value of each variable between the remaining samples and the 
attritors and to check the difference in the values by t-test. The other is to do a 
probit regression, whose dependent variable takes value one if the sample 
dropped some time during the survey period and zero if the sample remained 
constant until 2005. Since each cohort participated in the survey in a different 
 14 
year, the attrition bias is checked separately using the characteristics 
measured in each cohort’s starting year. The independent variables are 
household income per person, age, squared age, education, marital status, 
the number of family members, and living place. The living status is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if the sample lives with her parents and 
zero otherwise. 
  Table 1.2 shows that, in cohort A, attritors have higher household 
income per capita at 5% significance level although cohort B and C do not 
have significant difference in this variable. The probit result, table 3.3, 
indicates that in cohort A, attritors significantly have more household income 
per capita, too. Therefore, in analyzing micro income mobility, the model will 
be adjusted by the Inverse Probability Weighting method (IPW) and the 
regression results will be compared with those of the original model.      Also, 
according to table 1.2, in all cohorts, attritors have significantly more 
unmarried samples than the remaining samples. Table 1.3 also shows that the 
attritors include more unmarried samples than the remaining samples.   
These results can be explained by the research conducted by 
Sakamoto (2006). Sakamoto investigated attrition bias for JPSC and 
concluded that when people are about to get married or have just married, 
they tend to drop out of the survey. When women get married, they usually 
move to a new residence and sometimes it’s difficult to track them. Even if the 
questionnaires reach the samples again, their husbands might have disagreed 
with the wives continuing to participate in the survey because some questions 
are related to husbands’ privacy. This is why samples tend to drop when they 
get married. Consequently, attritors have a higher rate of unmarried samples 
who dropped out just before or after their marriage.       
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Table 1.1 Samples in JPSC 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cohort A 
Female 
Age 24-34 in 1993 
1,500 Obs. In 1993 
 
 
 
 
1,500 
 
 
 
1,422 
 
 
 
1,342 
 
 
 
1,298 
 
 
 
1,255 
 
 
 
1,196 
 
 
 
1,137 
 
 
 
1,102 
 
 
 
1,059 
 
 
 
1,032 
 
 
 
980 
 
 
 
944 
 
 
 
904 
Cohort B 
Female 
Age 24-27 in 1997 
500 Obs. In 1997 
 
     
 
 
500 
 
 
 
442 
 
 
 
412 
 
 
 
386 
 
 
 
366 
 
 
 
344 
 
 
 
323 
 
 
 
312 
 
 
 
292 
Cohort C 
Female 
Age 24-29 in 2003 
836 Obs. in 2003 
 
           
 
 
836 
 
 
 
724 
 
 
 
674 
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Table 1.2 Variable Means between Remaining Samples  
and Attritors in JPSC 
  Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C 
  Remaining Attritors Remaining Attritors Remaining Attritors 
Household 
Income 188.651 208.201** 210.1225 223.356 210.052 232.243 
Number of Obs. 829 475 261 197 637 146 
Age 29.959 29.737 25.459 25.490 26.599 26.333* 
Number of Obs. 904 518 292 208 674 162 
Junior High 0.020 0.023 0.062 0.068 0.037 0.050 
Number of Obs. 901 514 291 206 669 161 
High School 0.656 0.634 0.553 0.563 0.504 0.540 
Number of Obs. 901 514 291 206 669 161 
Junior College 0.202 0.210 0.237 0.175* 0.241 0.186 
Number of Obs. 901 514 291 206 669 161 
University 0.122 0.132 0.148 0.194 0.218 0.224 
Number of Obs. 901 514 291 206 669 161 
Marital Status 0.728 0.670** 0.445 0.341** 0.442 0.327** 
Number of Obs. 904 518 292 208 674 162 
Family Member 4.162 4.064 3.616 3.399 3.540 3.179** 
Number of Obs. 904 518 292 208 674 162 
Urban 0.803 0.799 0.842 0.870 0.832 0.840 
Number of Obs. 903 518 292 208 674 162 
Rural 0.197 0.201 0.158 0.130 0.168 0.160 
Number of Obs. 903 518 292 208 674 162 
Live with Parent 0.524 0.543 0.599 0.594 0.568 0.509 
Number of Obs. 895 512 289 207 673 161 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
 17 
 
Table 1.3 Results of Probit between Remaining Samples  
and Attritors in JPSC 
  Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C 
  Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E. Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E. 
Household 
Income 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Age -0.125 0.240 -0.330 3.100 -0.769 1.140 
Age squared 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.061 0.014 0.022 
Junior High - - - - - - 
High School -0.036 0.272 -0.039 0.281 -0.152 0.278 
Junior College 0.010 0.281 -0.362 0.309 -0.339 0.294 
University -0.032 0.290 -0.085 0.320 -0.267 0.300 
Marital Status -0.103 0.114 -0.418 0.186** -0.582 0.171** 
Family Member -0.009 0.036 -0.007 0.061 0.059 0.055 
Urban - - 0.181 0.190 - - 
Rural 0.050 0.095 - - 0.050 0.152 
Live with Parent 0.000 0.112 -0.165 0.215 -0.564 0.190** 
Constant 1.587 3.589 3.440 39.472 9.965 15.066 
Number of Obs.   1285   451   776 
Wald chi2   9.10   12.7   23.09 
Prob > chi2   0.5223   0.2410   0.0104 
Pseudo R2   0.0052   0.0209   0.0331 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -836.612 -301.744 -359.952 
 
4. Macro Household Income per Capita Mobility 
 In this section, the results of household income per capita mobility in 
three periods of different length of time, 1-year, 3-year, and 11-year are 
discussed. Before that, the macro economic situation and trend of some 
inequality measurements are reviewed to understand the background of this 
period. After investigating the macro mobility measurements, an interpretation 
of these results is discussed especially in terms of the structural change in the 
labor market in Japan. 
 After the bubble economy, a major recession started at the end of 
1980s and it took a long time to recover, especially in the banking sector. 
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Consequently, GDP growth stayed low level till 2002 (Figure 1.1 and 1.2). 
Particularly, in 1997, the currency crisis happened in Asia and exports to Asian 
countries declined, which resulted in negative GDP growth rate, although the 
Japanese yen did not depreciate so much and banking system also worked 
normally. In 2002, IT bubble collapsed in the US and since the US was the 
largest trading partner for Japan, this also damaged the Japanese economy.  
After these shocks, GDP growth in Japan got close to potential rate. The 
unemployment rate did not change as drastically as GDP growth (Figure 1.3). 
Usually it takes some time for unemployment to change when some shocks hit 
the economy. Also, changes to unemployment are more related to permanent 
shocks than temporally shocks. Thus, during the period of recession, the 
unemployment rate got worse from 1994 to 2002 and started to improve after 
the economy recovered in 2003. At the same time, close observation of labor 
market enables us to understand that it has long-term trend (Figure 1.4). The 
ratio of non-regular staff to total labor is getting larger and larger and this 
continues even after the economy has recovered. Also, unlike regular staff 
wages, non-regular staff wages have been stable at a low level (Figure 1.5 
and 1.6). This is because in Japan, companies give regular staff wages 
depending on their profit level through bonuses and do not change the number 
of employment so much. On the other hand, Japanese companies keep non-
regular workers’ wage at a certain level and adjust the labor cost by the 
employment number. Thus, when the economy is good, the company hires 
more non-regular staff and once the economy turns bad, they cut those 
workers. 
 Figure 1.7-1.10 represents the change in four different inequality 
measurements. Although these measurements have differences in detail, they 
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also indicate some similar movements. From 1994 to 1996, inequality declined 
and then it has an upward movement with some oscillation until 2001. In 2002, 
the inequality dropped once, and then it went up from 2003 to 2004. In 2005, 
some measurements show a decrease and other indicate an increase in 
inequality. 
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Figure 1.1 GDP Growth Rate 
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Figure 1.2 GDP per capita Growth Rate 
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Figure 1.3 Unemployment Trend 
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Figure 1.4 Regular vs Non-regular Staff Ratio 
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Figure 1.5 Annual Wage
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Figure 1.6 Wage Indices (2005 Wage = 100) 
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Figure 1.7 Gini Coefficient 
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Figure 1.8 Standard Deviation of Household Income 
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Figure 1.9 90-10 percentile log income differential     
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Figure 1.10 Log D5/D1 and log D9/D5 
 
4.1 1-year Income Mobility 
 The movements of 1-year income mobility, measured by the six 
different concepts defined in section2, can be divided into two groups (Figure 
1.11-1.16). One group contains mobility-as-time-dependence, direct income 
movement and mobility as an equalizer of long-term incomes, and the other 
contains positional movement, share movement and non-direct income 
movement.  
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    The first group indicates that income mobility decreased from 1994-
1995 to 1996-1997 and then increased until 2000-2001. After the mobility 
declined in 2002-2003, it climbed again. This movement is similar to the trend 
of GDP per capita growth rate. This makes sense because if GDP per capita 
grows, then people have more opportunities to earn a higher income. This fall 
reduces the correlation between the household income per capita in the base 
year and in the second year, which increases the mobility-as-time-dependence. 
Similarly, the fact that more people get a higher income raises the positive 
change of direct income movement. However, the increase in mobility as an 
equalizer of long-term incomes is not a self-evident result from GDP per capita 
growth. This might indicate that the income redistribution system in Japan 
works better when the gross national product rises. 
 The second group has a downward trend, except in 1997-1998 and in 
2003-2004. This means that the fluctuation in the percentile rank between the 
rich and the poor or the share change of household income per capita had 
reduced more and more. It is possible that the structure of the labor market 
has changed. According to the figure regarding the rate of regular staff and 
non-regular staff to the total labor force, the ratio of non-regular staff increased 
from 1994 to 2005. However, the wage difference between these two different 
types of employees did not change so much. Thus, more and more people 
had been engaged in jobs as non-regular staff with consistently lower wages. 
This could explain why the positional movement and share movement went 
down over the long run.  
 The downward trend of the non-directional income movement indicates 
that the extent of fluctuation in household income per capita became smaller. 
According to the results of the second group, it can be said that not only their 
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percentile rank or share income movement but also their absolute value 
change in household incomes fluctuated less because of the structural change 
in labor market. 
 Next, the income mobility is analyzed according to four categories; 
education (Figure 1.17-1.22), initial income (Figure 1.23-1.28), cohorts (Figure 
1.29-1.34) and parent’s income level (Figure1.35-1.40). Income transfer from 
parents is considered to be an important factor on influencing the household 
income, too. However, the survey contains the data on intra-generation 
transfer from 1998 for married samples only. Thus, the data might have a bias, 
and the number of observations is not large. In addition, the amount of income 
from parents to their children correlated with the parents’ income level across 
the available samples. Therefore, this paper will not analyze the income 
mobility by the amount of intra-generation income transfer.  
According to the level of education, positional movement declined in all 
groups, which means that people’s household income rank changed less 
within the group which has the same educational background. Except for the 
time dependence mobility measurement, the lower educated group is less 
volatile than the higher educated group.  
According to quartile of household income per capita in the base year, 
all six measurements indicate that the mobility tends to decline in each group. 
At least within each quartile, the mobility becomes smaller but it does not 
necessarily mean that people stay in the same quartile for a long time.    
 By cohort, cohort A is divided into two smaller cohorts; Pre-bubble and 
Bubble cohort. People who started to work during the bubble economy belong 
to Bubble cohort, and those who started their career before the bubble 
economy belong to Pre-Bubble cohort. Previous studies mention that in Japan, 
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the economic situation under which people start to work has a large impact on 
their lives. This is because life-long employment is still common and working 
conditions are largely determined by the starting point of their career although 
some other factors such as marriage might have an important effect on 
people’s lives. In most measurements, from 94-95 to 99-00, the pre-bubble 
cohort experienced less mobility than the bubble cohort. Then, in time 
dependence, directional movement, and mobility as an equalizer of long-term 
incomes, the pre-bubble cohort has a larger mobility than the bubble cohort, 
and in the other three measurements pre-bubble cohort has equal or less 
mobility than the bubble cohort. 
  By parent’s income level, except for the directional movement, each 
group is inclined to decrease the mobility within the group but its path to 
immobility is different from group to group. 
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Figure 1.11 Time Dependence    
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Figure 1.12 Positional Movement 
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Figure 1.13 Share Movement 
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Figure 1.14 Non-directional Movement 
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Figure 1.15 Directional Movement 
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Figure 1.16 Equalizer for a long-term Income 
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Figure 1.17 Time Dependence by Education 
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Figure 1.18 Positional Movement by Education 
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Figure 1.19 Share Movement by Education 
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Figure 1.20 Non-directional Movement by Education 
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Figure 1.21 Directional Movement by Education 
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Figure 1.22 Equalizer for a Long-term Income by Education 
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Figure 1.23 Time Dependence by Quartile in Base Year 
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Figure 1.24 Positional Movement by Quartile in Base Year 
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Figure 1.25 Share Movement by Quartile in Base Year 
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Figure 1.26 Non-directional Movement by Quartile in Base Year 
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   Figure 1.27 Directional Movement by Quartile in Base Year         
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Figure 1.28 Equalizer for a Long-term Income by Quartile 
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05
Year
Pre-Bubble Bubble
Source: JPSC, Our calculation
 
Figure 1.29 Time Dependence by Cohort 
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Figure 1.30 Positional Movement by Cohort 
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Figure 1.31 Share Movement by Cohort   
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Figure 1.32 Non-directional Movement by Cohort 
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Figure 1.33 Directional Movement by Cohort 
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Figure 1.34 Equalizer for a long-term Income 
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Figure 1.35 Time Dependence by Parent’s Income 
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Figure 1.36 Positional Movement by Parent’s Income 
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Figure 1.37 Share Movement by Parent’s Income   
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Figure 1.38 Non-directional Movement by Parent’s Income 
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Figure 1.39 Directional Movement by Parent’s Income 
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Figure 1.40 Equalizer for a Long-term Income by Parent’s Income 
 
4.2 3-year Income Mobility 
 Tables 1.4-1.6 show the 3-year macro income mobility. Time 
dependence mobility and mobility as an equalizer of long-term incomes have 
the maximum value in 1998-2001 and the minimum value in 2002-2005. Thus, 
according to these measurements, first the mobility-as-time-dependence and 
mobility as an equalizer of long-term incomes increased in 1998-2001, and 
then decreased in 2002-2005.   
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 On the other hand, the values of positional movement, share movement 
and non-directional income movement decreased from 1994-1997 to 2002-
2005. This means that the income mobility in terms of percentile rank, income 
share and absolute value change went down over 12 years.  
 As for directional income movement, the value went down for 1998-
2001 and then went up for 2002-2005. This might be because during 1998-
2002 more people experienced an income decrease compared with the other 
two periods. 
 By education, in time dependence, technical college, junior college, and 
university graduates have the lease mobility for 2002-2005, but high school 
graduates have the highest mobility for 2002-2005.  In positional movement, 
the mobility of all groups dropped from 1994-1997 to 2002-2005. In share 
movement and non-directional movement, all groups had less mobility for 
2002-2005 than for 1994-1997 but the paths of decline are different. Only high 
school graduates have positive value in directional movement in all three 
periods, in contrast, other groups had at least one negative value. 
  By quartile of initial income in base year, the mobility of1st, 2nd, and 4th 
quartile declined over the three periods but 3rd quartile had higher mobility in 
2002-2005 than in 1998-2001. In positional movement, all groups decrease 
their mobility. The mobility did not change so much in share movement and 
non-directional movement for all groups. In directional movement, 1st and 2nd 
quartile had positive values, and 3rd and 4th quartile had negative values 
throughout the survey periods. The value of the equalizer for a long-term 
inequality went down from 199401997 to 2002-2005 for all groups. 
 By cohort, in time dependence, share movement and non-directional 
movement, for the bubble cohort, their mobility decreased over the three 
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periods and for the pre-bubble cohort, first the mobility increased from 1994-
1997 to 1998-2001, and then the mobility declined. In share movement, for 
both cohorts, mobility throughout the three periods reduced. In directional 
movement, the pre- bubble cohort had all positive values, whereas the bubble 
cohort had all negative values. Equalizer for a long-term mobility had stable 
movement for both cohorts. There was no significant difference in the mobility 
pattern between the pre-bubble and the bubble cohort as a whole.  
 By parent’s income level, in almost all measurements except directional 
movements, the mobility declined over three periods for each group. Under 
these circumstances, the lower middle and upper middle groups had higher 
mobility than others in almost all measurements. The lower group had the 
least mobility except directional movement.       
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Table 1.4 3-year Income Mobility by Entire Sample in JPSC 
Period Time Dependence Positional movement Share movement 
Non-directional 
movement  
Directional 
movement 
Mobility as an 
equalizer 
1994-1997 0.368 16.496 0.350 0.381 0.017 0.061 
1998-2001 0.446 15.422 0.335 0.349 0.011 0.085 
2002-2005 0.273 13.456 0.280 0.319 0.013 0.056 
 
 
Table 1.5 3-year Income Mobility by Education 
Group Period Time Dependence 
Positional 
movement 
Share 
movement 
Non-
directional 
movement  
Directional 
movement 
Mobility as 
an equalizer 
High School 
1994-1997 0.423 17.840 0.339 0.368 0.009 0.061 
1998-2001 0.316 14.749 0.284 0.313 0.020 0.058 
2002-2005 0.432 13.682 0.306 0.331 0.003 0.052 
Tech College 
1994-1997 0.276 15.114 0.301 0.369 0.008 0.079 
1998-2001 0.467 14.700 0.326 0.311 -0.011 -0.013 
2002-2005 0.168 11.809 0.224 0.269 0.056 0.053 
Junior 
College 
1994-1997 0.398 16.795 0.349 0.377 -0.019 0.063 
1998-2001 0.491 14.515 0.338 0.298 0.036 0.152 
2002-2005 0.226 14.366 0.248 0.310 0.049 0.076 
University 
1994-1997 0.417 20.380 0.423 0.446 0.118 0.045 
1998-2001 0.242 14.378 0.294 0.318 -0.009 0.073 
2002-2005 0.157 11.265 0.225 0.261 -0.005 0.070 
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Table 1.6 3-year Income Mobility by Quartile in Base Year 
Group Period Time Dependence 
Positional 
movement 
Share 
movement 
Non-
directional 
movement  
Directional 
movement 
Mobility as 
an equalizer 
1st 
1994-1997 1.000 27.307 0.437 0.522 0.348 0.311 
1998-2001 0.641 16.445 0.349 0.325 0.035 0.012 
2002-2005 0.263 14.018 0.263 0.289 0.063 0.058 
2nd 
1994-1997 0.790 26.730 0.292 0.311 0.009 0.416 
1998-2001 0.484 18.147 0.264 0.272 0.015 0.082 
2002-2005 0.476 16.165 0.279 0.321 0.014 0.096 
3rd 
1994-1997 0.737 26.588 0.298 0.307 -0.059 0.416 
1998-2001 0.362 17.316 0.259 0.281 -0.024 0.139 
2002-2005 0.487 13.770 0.269 0.293 -0.002 0.083 
4th 
1994-1997 0.567 25.577 0.349 0.389 -0.234 0.291 
1998-2001 0.530 17.988 0.349 0.369 -0.012 0.156 
2002-2005 0.218 11.776 0.242 0.279 -0.032 0.086 
 
Table 1.7 3-year Income Mobility by Cohort 
Group Period Time Dependence 
Positional 
movement 
Share 
movement 
Non-
directional 
movement  
Directional 
movement 
Mobility as an 
equalizer 
Pre-Bubble 
1994-1997 0.307 15.700 0.313 0.341 0.042 0.046 
1998-2001 0.403 13.212 0.280 0.282 0.044 0.087 
2002-2005 0.316 12.330 0.268 0.305 0.045 0.039 
Bubble 
1994-1997 0.463 18.022 0.397 0.446 -0.025 0.090 
1998-2001 0.418 14.669 0.341 0.355 -0.037 0.035 
2002-2005 0.167 12.598 0.253 0.307 -0.015 0.080 
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Table 1.8 3-year Income Mobility by Parent’s Income 
Group Period Time Dependence 
Positional 
movement 
Share 
movement 
Non-
directional 
movement  
Directional 
movement 
Mobility as an 
equalizer 
Lower 
1994-1997 0.266 14.830 0.286 0.326 0.051 0.086 
1998-2001 0.176 13.073 0.259 0.312 0.066 0.076 
2002-2005 0.180 12.842 0.262 0.314 0.078 0.045 
Lower Middle 
1994-1997 0.348 17.517 0.320 0.363 0.050 0.104 
1998-2001 0.405 12.063 0.276 0.253 -0.002 0.053 
2002-2005 0.266 13.032 0.249 0.295 -0.060 0.072 
Upper Middle 
1994-1997 0.552 19.920 0.399 0.440 -0.059 0.099 
1998-2001 0.334 17.388 0.298 0.351 0.008 0.094 
2002-2005 0.367 12.465 0.286 0.289 0.024 0.060 
Upper 
1994-1997 0.390 15.746 0.363 0.371 -0.036 0.060 
1998-2001 0.594 15.705 0.377 0.337 -0.023 0.076 
2002-2005 0.265 12.459 0.254 0.291 0.031 0.053 
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4.3 11-year Income Mobility 
   Table 1.9 shows 11-year income mobility. These results show a trend 
over the whole period of the survey from 1994 to 2005. Time dependence had 
the value of 0.579. Compared with the shorter-term values, this result 
indicates that the longer the period was, the larger the income mobility in 
Japan was.  Then, positional movement also shows that more people 
experienced positional movement in 11 years than in 3 years or in 1 year. The 
value of share movement had the value of 0.479. This movement suggests the 
frequency and magnitude of the household share changes got larger as the 
length of the period became longer.  
 Non-directional income movement, 0.522, gauges the extent of 
fluctuation in the incomes of households. Compared with the value of 
directional income movement which measures the direction of the income 
change as well as their amounts, 0.019, the result indicates that some people 
experienced upward fluctuation and others faced downward movement. 
However, as a whole society, positive mobility was a little larger than negative 
over these 11 years.   
Mobility as an equalizer of long-term incomes, 0.125, considers how the 
income changes experienced by households caused the inequality of longer-
term incomes to differ from the inequality of the base-year incomes. According 
to this measurement, Japanese society had more inequality in 2005 than in 
1994. This result reaches the same conclusion as the previous studies.   
 From these results, it can be said that some households experienced 
upward changes whereas others encountered downward movements of 
income per capita both in their percentile rank and in the real-term value from 
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1994 to 2005. Therefore, in the end, the overall inequality in Japanese society 
worsened over 12 years.  
 Next, the 11-year mobility by categories is discussed. By education, 
there is no specific group which had distinct values from the other groups. 
High school graduates and junior college graduates, which consist of the 
majority of the sample, experienced more time dependence mobility and less 
positional movement and share movement compared with the other two 
groups. Thus, the value of household income per capita changed by relatively 
large amount but it did not necessarily lead to position or share within the 
groups. On the other hand, technical college graduates and university 
graduates did not experience the value change in household income per 
capita but their position or share moved within their groups. 
 By quartile of initial household income in the base year, in general, their 
values in six measurements were larger than those by the other categories. It 
means that the mobility within a group was higher categorized by initial income 
in the base year. Among these groups, the second quartile group had less 
mobility than the others. By cohort, the bubble cohort had higher mobility than 
the pre-bubble cohort in all six measurements. The bubble cohort might have 
more choices than the pre-bubble cohort regarding their life styles. 
 By parent’s income level, the upper group was more mobile than the 
other groups, and the lower group had the least mobility in most 
measurements. This means that if parents have high income, daughters 
encounter a variety of opportunities in their life, which causes the larger 
mobility within the group. On the other hand, if their parents are not so rich, the 
options for their daughters are limited and their household incomes do not 
change so frequently.     
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Table 1.9 11-year Income Mobility 
Group Time Dependence 
Positional 
movement 
Share 
movement 
Non-
directional 
movement  
Directional 
movement 
Mobility as an 
equalizer 
Entire Sample 0.579 22.811 0.479 0.522 0.019 0.125 
By Education             
High School 0.654 22.604 0.451 0.490 0.023 0.150 
Tech College 0.571 25.949 0.512 0.573 -0.012 0.156 
Junior College 0.605 23.590 0.456 0.509 0.016 0.110 
University 0.646 24.847 0.527 0.575 0.055 0.132 
By Quartile             
1st 0.874 28.749 0.461 0.615 0.441 0.305 
2nd 0.853 29.415 0.359 0.428 0.106 0.412 
3rd 0.931 31.855 0.410 0.450 -0.117 0.464 
4th 0.870 31.407 0.486 0.596 -0.397 0.422 
By Cohort          
Pre-Bubble 0.506 21.025 0.423 0.478 0.118 0.103 
Bubble 0.640 24.464 0.543 0.590 -0.139 0.163 
By Parent's income             
Lower 0.423 20.095 0.401 0.465 0.183 0.147 
Lower Middle 0.459 23.398 0.424 0.499 -0.017 0.151 
Upper Middle 0.664 24.359 0.487 0.502 -0.048 0.193 
Upper 0.710 26.687 0.543 0.603 -0.096 0.146 
 44 
In conclusion, at the macro level, the household income per capita 
mobility became lower in the long-run as a whole. The structure of the labor 
market changed and more and more people had jobs as non-regular staff. The 
non-regular staff wage had been stable but when the economy seemed good, 
the companies hired many non-regular staff. However, once the economy 
seemed to turn bad, they could easily reduce the number of non-regular staff, 
which reflected the change in unemployment rate. Thus, when the change in 
GDP growth rate was large, the income of household who had non-regular 
staff may have fluctuated. According to Wakita (2006), the labor market in 
Japan is not fluid even among regular staff or among non-regular staff, so the 
liquidity between regular and non-regular staff is especially low. Wakita further 
states there exists a hug gap in their wage between regular and non-regular 
staff. In this research groups, even if the income of households who had non-
regular staff changes following GDP growth, the percentile rank and share 
movement might not change so much. Since the number of non-regular staff 
had gone up, the inequality in Japanese society would probably get worse in 
the future.    
When the macro mobility is observed by some categories, various 
aspects of mobility are captured. By education, the groups of people who had 
higher education had more mobility in household income within a group than 
people who had lower education. Similarly, the household income of the 
people whose parents earned higher incomes fluctuated more within the group 
than those whose parents earned lower wages. This indicates that when 
people have more choices regarding their life style, the income within those 
groups has more dynamism compared with the group of people who has 
limited alternatives. Also, the same principle can be applied to the macro 
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mobility by cohort. People who started their career before the bubble economy 
had less choices regarding their career than people found their jobs under the 
bubble economy. Thus, the bubble cohort had more mobility on their 
household income than the pre-bubble cohort.  
As for the quartile of initial income there was no significant difference in 
household income per capita across their groups. All groups had high mobility 
than other categories. It might be a fact that the initial income of the samples 
did not represent the characteristics to decide future household income per 
capita. This is because the samples were women who were in their 20s in 
base year. Since the people who had lower education started their jobs earlier 
than those who had higher education, their wages in their 20s might be higher 
or equal to higher educated people. However, usually the wages of higher 
educated people exceed lower educated people’s wages in their 30s. 
Consequently, in this case, initial wages in their 20s might not be a good 
indicator to capture the factors which decide the difference in their future 
income.       
 
5. Micro Household Income per Capita Mobility 
 In this section, the results of unconditional and conditional household 
income mobility are examined. Micro mobility focuses on the mobility of the 
individual and answers the question: which individuals moved up/down in the 
earnings distribution over time and by how much?  To begin answering this 
question, mobility profiles are presented which show the mean and the 
standard deviation of one-year household income changes for the different 
subgroups of individuals. These statistics for individuals are broken down by 
education, initial income quartile, cohort and parent’s income level. First, the 
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unconditional mobility indicates to what extent there is convergence between 
the incomes of the rich and the poor over time. Then, the conditional mobility 
explores that if conditional convergence level exists, how soon household 
incomes converge to their predicted level depending on a set of observable 
and unobservable characteristics. The conditional mobility models are used to 
study the correlation of the household income changes while holding other 
variables constant. The model in this study specifies the income changes as a 
function of initial household income, cohort, education, parent’s income level, 
marital status, the number of family members, employment status, living area, 
living condition in terms of the relationship with their parents, housing 
ownership, and age. The results are not interpreted as a causal model of 
household income changes, but rather a way of answering the question of 
which individuals experience the most positive income changes, holding other 
things equal.  
 
5.1 Micro Mobility Profile Results 
 Table 1.10-1.14 show the results of micro mobility profile in the 
Japanese Yen from 1994-2005 including cohort A, from 1997-2005 including 
cohort A and B, and from 2003-2005 including cohort A, B, and C respectively. 
As a whole, the mean of the one-year income change is very small compared 
with their total household income per capita. This is caused by the low GDP 
growth rate over this period. On the other hand, the standard deviation of one-
year household income change is large. Thus, the individual level of mobility 
seems distributed on broad range. 
 In table 1.10, the 4th quartile experienced a larger household income 
change than other quartiles. Also, the bubble cohort had larger standard 
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deviation than the pre-bubble cohort. By education, it is recognized that the 
higher educated people had larger standard deviation of household income 
mobility although their mean was not much different among education level. 
By parent’s income level, the standard deviation was larger as their parents’ 
income level was higher, but the mean of the one-year household income 
change was lower as their parents got higher incomes. According to table 
5.2.1, inequality of mean household income across groups within categories 
from 1994-2005 was largest for initial household income quartile and the 
smallest for education.  
 Next, in table 1.12, by initial income quartile, the same trend as table 
1.10 is observed. By cohort, the standard deviation of the pre-bubble cohort 
increased although the one of the bubble cohort decreased. By education and 
by parent’s income level, the same trends as table 1.10 are recognized; the 
higher educated people had a larger standard deviation of the household 
income mobility, and the standard deviation was larger as their parents income 
level got higher. According to table 1.13, inequality of mean household income 
across groups within categories was the largest for initial household income 
quartile and the smallest for education and parent’s income level. 
 In table 1.14, by initial income quartile, the higher initial household 
income quartile had a lower mean one-year household income change and 
larger standard deviation. By cohort, cohort C had the largest standard 
deviation and the pre-bubble cohort and the bubble cohort had less standard 
deviation than table 1.10 and 1.12 By education, higher educated people had 
the larger standard deviation and by parent’s income level the standard 
deviation was larger as their parents income level got higher. According to 
table 1.15, inequality of mean household income across groups within 
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categories was the largest for initial household income quartile and the 
smallest for cohort.   
  Therefore, according to the micro mobility profile results, people whose 
initial household income quartile was higher tended to have lower mean and 
higher standard deviation of one-year household income change. By cohort, 
the cohort composed of younger people had a higher standard deviation of 
one-year income change.  Also, the standard deviation of the higher educated 
people tended to be larger, and as parent’s income level got higher, people’s 
one-year household income change became larger.    
 
Table 1.10 Micro Mobility Profile for One-year Household Income Change   
in the Japanese Yen from 1994-2005 (Cohort A) 
  Observation Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total sample 9646 0.888 98.528 -1791.334 2426.385 
            
By Initial 
Income in 1994       
Quartile1 2288 5.900 74.115 -1791.334 1774.508 
Quartile2 2412 3.255 76.508 -990.345 1240.595 
Quartile3 2552 1.520 82.587 -983.585 1008.055 
Quartile4 2394 -6.960 143.588 -1680.448 2426.385 
        
By Cohort           
Pre-Bubble 5919 2.252 94.795 -1680.448 2426.385 
Bubble 3727 -1.278 104.158 -1791.334 1774.508 
        
By Education           
High School 4321 0.843 76.783 -990.345 1008.055 
Tech College 1941 0.877 108.521 -1791.334 1774.508 
Junior College 2036 0.325 111.566 -1680.448 2426.385 
University 1296 2.079 123.653 -1507.340 1409.248 
            
By Parent's 
Income       
Lower 2489 3.639 70.291 -990.345 880.059 
Lower Middle 2944 0.575 82.248 -1680.448 1651.180 
Upper Middle 1936 -0.170 85.625 -983.585 1008.055 
Upper 2277 -0.813 144.031 -1791.334 2426.385 
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Table 1.11 Inequality of Mean Household Income across Groups within 
Categories from 1994-2005 (Cohort A) 
  Inequality of Income Changes across Groups within Categories 
Initial Income  4.770 
Cohort 1.765 
Education 0.524 
Parent's Income 1.702 
 
Table 1.12 Micro Mobility Profile for One-year Household Income Change  
in the Japanese Yen from 1997-2005 (Cohort A & B) 
  Observation Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total sample 6536 2.822 101.029 -1680.448 2426.385 
            
By Initial Income 
in 1997       
Quartile1 1512 8.209 94.332 -1676.581 1859.931 
Quartile2 1644 2.866 54.275 -409.365 587.342 
Quartile3 1731 4.488 88.258 -983.585 1008.055 
Quartile4 1649 -3.912 145.351 -1680.448 2426.385 
        
By Cohort           
Pre-Bubble 903 4.064 148.614 -1676.581 1859.931 
Bubble 1813 -1.215 89.860 -939.728 647.082 
Cohort B 3820 4.444 91.691 -1680.448 2426.385 
            
By Education           
High School 2967 2.365 74.952 -983.585 1008.055 
Tech College 1253 2.349 95.172 -777.929 1561.014 
Junior College 1408 4.359 138.405 -1680.448 2426.385 
University 880 3.133 114.321 -1053.152 1084.061 
            
By Parent's 
Income           
Lower 2398 2.806 69.143 -777.929 623.131 
Lower Middle 1989 2.704 61.222 -458.939 419.390 
Upper Middle 1152 3.026 125.750 -1680.448 1651.180 
Upper 997 2.857 172.363 -1676.581 2426.385 
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Table 1.13 Inequality of Mean Household Income across Groups within 
Categories from 1997-2005 (Cohort B) 
  Inequality of Income Changes across Groups within Categories 
Initial Income 4.740 
Cohort 3.423 
Education 2.035 
Parent's Income 2.017 
 
Table 1.14 Micro Mobility Profile for One-year Household Income Change 
in the Japanese Yen from 2003-2005 (Cohort A & B &C) 
  Observation Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total sample 3193 3.418 100.204 -1661.675 888.613 
            
By Initial 
Income in 2003           
Quartile1 772 19.980 68.162 -459.122 499.502 
Quartile2 803 8.778 70.386 -409.365 888.613 
Quartile3 827 2.426 77.526 -369.083 522.119 
Quartile4 791 -17.149 154.920 -1661.675 786.369 
         
By Cohort           
Pre-Bubble 925 2.536 81.107 -990.345 869.784 
Bubble 590 3.594 70.598 -459.122 499.502 
Cohort B 529 2.260 91.903 -611.390 737.665 
Cohort C 1149 4.571 127.197 -1661.675 888.613 
            
By Education           
High School 1332 4.070 83.290 -990.345 869.784 
Tech College 611 1.834 86.075 -494.257 737.665 
Junior College 704 7.922 103.180 -459.541 888.613 
University 532 0.426 122.465 -1137.448 596.072 
            
By Parent's 
Income        
Lower 1153 2.101 77.272 -990.345 737.665 
Lower Middle 951 4.811 93.757 -1661.675 769.399 
Upper Middle 482 6.828 101.315 -542.605 869.784 
Upper 607 1.031 139.958 -1137.448 888.613 
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Table 1.15 Inequality of Mean Household Income across Groups within 
Categories from 2003-2005 (Cohort A & B & C)  
  
Inequality of Income 
Changes across Groups 
within Categories 
Initial Income 13.594 
Cohort 1.732 
Education 3.818 
Parent's Income 3.295 
 
5.2 Unconditional Household Income per Capita Mobility 
The model of unconditional household income mobility is as follows: 
 
tititi uYY ,1,, ++=∆ −βα  
tiY , =Household income per capita 
 
Table 1.16-1.18 represents the results of the regression with 
unconditional household income mobility model from 1994-2005 including 
cohort A, from 1997-2005 including cohort A and B, and from 2003-2005 
including cohort A, B, and C respectively. According to the Durbin Watson test, 
the models did not have serial correlation. Since it is likely that there existed 
attrition bias in the household incomes, the robust model is compared with the 
one adjusted by the inverse probability weighting method (IWP).   
In all of these models, β  took negative values and they were all 
significant at the 1 % significance level. The values of the coefficients and 
constants between the model with and without IPW were very close in table 
1.16 and 1.17, but there was some difference in table 1.18. This might be 
because cohort A and B did not have any serious attrition bias to affect the 
regression but the attrition bias of cohort C was relatively strong although they 
participated in the survey for a short time.  
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 The results of these models indicate that there is convergence between 
the household incomes of the initially rich and the initially poor households. 
This shows the possibility for equality of opportunity in Japanese society. 
 
Table 1.16 Results for One-year Household Income Change  
with Unconditional Mobility Model from 1994-2005 (Cohort A) 
Variable One-year income change One-year income change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.252 0.028*** -0.255 0.028*** 
Constant 49.732 4.996*** 48.958 4.836*** 
N   9646   9594 
R2   0.120   0.121 
Root MSE   92.458   89.833 
 
Table 1.17 Results for One-year Household Income Change 
 with Unconditional Mobility Model from 1997-2005 (Cohort A & B) 
Variable One-year income change One-year income change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.219 0.034*** -0.227 0.038*** 
Constant 45.503 6.195*** 45.354 6.535*** 
N   6536   6508 
R2   0.082   0.086 
Root MSE   96.787   91.734 
 
Table 1.18 Results for One-year Household Income Change 
 with Unconditional Mobility Model from 2003-2005 (Cohort A & B & C) 
Variable One-year income change One-year income change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.254 0.043*** -0.197 0.025*** 
Constant 54.754 8.058*** 41.056 4.132*** 
N   3193   3179 
R2   0.124   0.081 
Root MSE   93.793   80.223 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1 % level 
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5.3 Conditional Household Income per capita Mobility 
   In the conditional income mobility model, the coefficients did not 
capture the extent to which the initially poorer households caught up with the 
initially richer ones. Instead it estimated the extent to which the poorer and the 
richer households who were observationally equivalent in terms of some 
characteristics such as education had the income patterns that converged 
over time.   
First, I checked the relationship between the one-year household 
incomes per capita change and time-invariant variables. The conditional 
household income mobility model, which is employed with time-invariant 
variables, is as follows: 
 
tiititi ZYY ,31,1, εββα +++=∆ −  
tiY , =Household income per capita in year t 
iZ =Initial household income per capita quartile dummy, Cohort dummy, 
Education dummy, and Parent’s income level dummy 
 
Table 1.19-1.21 represents the results of regression with the time-
invariant variables from 1994-2005 including cohort A, from 1997-2005 
including cohort A and B, and from 2003-2005 including cohort A, B, and C 
respectively.  
In all cases, 1β  had negative values and they were all significant at the 
1 % significance level. This indicates that there was convergence between the 
household incomes of the initially rich and the initially poor households. In 
addition, the coefficients of the initial household income quartile dummy 
variables had positive signs in all cases and it seems that people who had 
 54 
higher initial household income had larger positive one-year household income 
per capita change. Regarding the education dummy variables, it can be said 
that the higher educated people experienced larger positive household income 
changes. The coefficients of the cohort dummy and the parent’s income level 
were not significant in most cases and some specific trends were not observed 
from these results. 
 
Table 1.19 Results for One-year Household Income Change 
with Time-invariant Variables from 1994-2005 (Cohort A) 
Variable One-year income change 
One-year income 
change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.354 0.034*** -0.358 0.034*** 
2nd Quartile 8.348 2.418*** 8.413 2.389*** 
3rd Quartile 21.489 3.578*** 21.594 3.570*** 
4th Quartile 52.509 6.852*** 52.518 6.892*** 
Cohort A2 (Bubble) -3.806 2.022* -3.704 1.907* 
Tech college 6.544 2.522*** 6.349 2.470** 
Junior college 5.481 2.423** 5.555 2.293* 
University 30.022 3.972*** 29.800 3.907*** 
Lower middle parent's wage -1.756 1.949 -1.206 1.870 
Upper middle parent's wage -5.650 2.406** -4.608 2.300** 
Upper parent's wage 1.208 3.102 2.443 3.027 
Constant 44.916 3.886*** 44.987 3.870*** 
N   9594   9594 
R2   0.159   0.161 
Root MSE   90.570   87.819 
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Table 1.20 Micro Mobility Results for One-year Household Income 
Change with Time-invariant Variables from 1997-2005 (Cohort A & B) 
Variable One-year income change 
One-year income 
change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.356 0.048*** -0.375 0.052*** 
2nd Quartile 5.063 3.311 6.161 2.951** 
3rd Quartile 26.629 5.782*** 29.204 5.609*** 
4th Quartile 60.842 11.100*** 67.271 11.183*** 
Cohort A2 (Bubble) -7.845 5.008 -8.429 4.954* 
Cohort B 2.774 4.934 1.156 4.917 
Tech college 2.647 2.919 1.398 2.649 
Junior college 5.222 3.321 3.854 3.008 
University 21.485 4.827*** 19.863 4.663*** 
Lower middle parent's wage 2.346 2.022 2.098 1.874 
Upper middle parent's wage 3.572 3.572 3.212 3.440 
Upper parent's wage 13.537 5.259** 13.413 5.074*** 
Constant 41.332 6.714*** 44.480 7.231*** 
N   6508   6508 
R2   0.126   0.135 
Root MSE   94.562   89.320 
 
Table 1.21 Micro Mobility Results for One-year Household Income 
Change with Time-invariant Variables from 2003-2005 (Cohort A & B &C) 
Variable One-year income change One-year income change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.381 0.053*** -0.363 0.048*** 
2nd Quartile 7.399 4.382* 9.511 4.275** 
3rd Quartile 23.251 7.006*** 27.336 6.609*** 
4th Quartile 62.433 13.749*** 64.146 12.829*** 
Cohort A2 (Bubble) -0.733 3.811 -2.616 3.658 
Cohort B -5.516 4.646 -6.093 4.219 
Cohort C -1.844 4.236 1.934 4.554 
Tech college 2.976 3.908 0.317 3.524 
Junior college 8.223 4.292* 2.556 3.654 
University 20.466 5.515** 15.322 5.308*** 
Lower middle parent's wage 8.531 3.313*** 9.963 2.889*** 
Upper middle parent's wage 9.748 5.407* 13.338 6.095** 
Upper parent's wage 12.177 5.773** 14.650 5.943** 
Constant 46.868 5.292*** 42.204 4.364*** 
N   3179   3179 
R2   0.136   0.121 
Root MSE   89.294   78.610 
* Significant at 10% level 
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** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1 % level 
 
The model of conditional household income mobility including time-
variant variables is as follows: 
 
tiitititi ZXYY ,3,21,1, εβββα ++∆++=∆ −  
tiY , =Household income per capita in time t  
tiX , =Marital status dummy, Number of family members, Employment 
status dummy, Region dummy, Living condition dummy, and Housing 
ownership dummy in time t  
iZ = Initial household income per capita quartile dummy, Cohort dummy, 
Education dummy, Parent’s income level dummy, Age, and Age-
squared 
 
This model includes several additional dummy variables and table 1.22 
explains their characteristics. 
Table 1.23-1.25 represents the results of regression with the time-
invariant variables from 1994-2005 including cohort A, from 1997-2005 
including cohort A and B, and from 2003-2005 including cohort A, B, and C 
respectively.  According to the Durbin Watson test, the models did not have 
serial correlation. Since it is likely that there existed the attrition bias in the 
household incomes, the robust model was compared with the one adjusted by 
the inverse probability weighting method (IWP).   
In all cases, 1β  had negative values and they were all significant at the 
1 % significance level. This indicates that there was convergence between the 
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household incomes of the initially rich and the initially poor households. 
Regarding the initial household income quartile dummy variables and 
education dummy variables, the same pattern as the previous model could be 
observed; the people who had higher initial household income had larger 
positive one-year household income per capita change and the higher 
educated people experienced larger positive household income change. The 
coefficients of cohort dummy and parent’s income level are not significant in 
most cases and some specific trends were not observed from these results, 
either. 
When women got married or married couples started to live with 
husband’s parents, the household income per capita experienced positive 
change. However, when the number of family member increased, their 
household income per capita decreased. This makes sense because in 
general, their husbands or parents have higher income than the samples. 
Thus, if they live with the people who have higher income, their household 
income per capita goes up. On the other hand, when they give birth to a baby, 
they have more dependents, which leads to a decline in household income per 
capita. The change of employment status did not have a strong impact on the 
household income per capita against logic. This might be because in Japan, 
women are engaged in their jobs only when their husbands’ wages decrease 
and they need to make up for the loss. After they start to work, their wage 
brings additional income into their households but at the same time, the 
decreases in their husbands’ wages have a negative effect, so both canceled 
each other out. The changes in living place and in housing ownership did not 
have a specific effect on the one-year household income per capita change. 
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 Age and age-squared had significant coefficients and considering 
realistic cases, it means that as people got older at the early stage of their 
lives, the one-year household income change dropped perhaps because they 
had more dependents with having children. Then after passing a certain age, 
their children left their houses and the number of dependents fell, which 
caused the increase in household income per capita. 
   
 Micro mobility profiles show that people whose initial household income 
quartile was higher tend to have lower mean and higher standard deviation of 
one-year household income change. By cohort, the cohort composed of 
younger people had a higher standard deviation of one-year income change.  
Also, the standard deviation of the higher educated people tended to be larger, 
and as parent’s income level climbed, people’s one-year household income 
change became larger. The unconditional micro income mobility indicates that 
it is possible that the poorer people would catch up with the richer people. 
Then, the conditional micro income mobility also indicates that there existed 
conditional convergence. People who had higher initial incomes or a higher 
education had larger positive changes in their one-year household incomes. 
Also, when the people started to live with others who had higher wages, their 
one-year household income changes went up. On the other hand, the 
increase in the number of dependents reduced the household income per 
capita.       
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Table 1.22 Dummy Variables 
Dummy Variable 1 0 
Marital status Married Not married 
Employment status Employed Unemployed 
Region Living in urban area Living in rural area 
Living condition Living with parents Living separately from parents 
Housing ownership Owning house Not owning house 
 
 
Table 1.23 Results for One-year Household Income Change  
 from 1994-2005 (Cohort A) 
Variable One-year income change 
One-year income 
change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.364 0.034*** -0.368 0.034*** 
2nd Quartile 8.886 2.404*** 8.980 2.372*** 
3rd Quartile 23.000 3.570*** 23.104 3.560*** 
4th Quartile 53.995 6.869*** 53.946 6.907*** 
Cohort A2 (Bubble) -5.229 2.186** -5.327 2.047*** 
Tech college 5.316 2.468** 5.187 2.420** 
Junior college 3.589 2.376 3.733 2.240* 
University 29.623 3.822*** 29.381 3.771*** 
Lower middle parent's wage -1.035 1.906 -0.522 1.825 
Upper middle parent's wage -4.875 2.320** -3.804 2.221* 
Upper parent's wage 1.610 3.024 2.862 2.948 
Marital status change 50.481 11.354*** 51.341 10.603*** 
Family member change -37.156 3.123*** -35.608 2.996*** 
Employment status change -1.982 2.547 -1.521 2.363 
Region change 13.738 12.665 10.967 11.339 
Living condition change 39.889 9.592*** 37.228 8.913*** 
Housing ownership change 11.506 10.377 10.667 9.277 
Age -10.504 2.896*** -10.569 2.780*** 
Age-squared 0.147 0.040*** 0.148 0.038*** 
Constant 225.408 53.026*** 227.442 50.923*** 
N   9491   9491 
R2   0.202   0.204 
Root MSE   87.954   85.302 
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Table 1.24 Micro Mobility Results for One-year Household Income 
Change from 1997-2005 (Cohort A & B) 
Variable One-year income change 
One-year income 
change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.3571 0.049*** -0.376 0.052*** 
2nd Quartile 5.8153 3.234* 6.693 2.891** 
3rd Quartile 26.3847 5.809*** 28.899 5.607*** 
4th Quartile 60.0549 11.174*** 66.219 11.178*** 
Cohort A2 (Bubble) -3.7913 4.973 -4.018 4.816 
Cohort B 4.0795 6.205 3.357 5.704 
Tech college 3.0693 2.828 1.695 2.568 
Junior college 4.5843 3.241 3.186 2.941 
University 21.2118 4.674*** 19.724 4.527*** 
Lower middle parent's wage 1.9765 1.984 2.068 1.844 
Upper middle parent's wage 2.2829 3.505 2.328 3.426 
Upper parent's wage 12.5224 5.053** 12.956 4.894*** 
Marital status change 48.9947 13.553*** 52.877 11.890*** 
Family member change -43.2739 4.188*** -39.819 3.954*** 
Employment status change -3.7665 3.268 -4.335 3.028 
Region change 11.5609 9.658 7.661 7.415 
Living condition change 30.4221 10.677*** 26.446 9.863*** 
Housing ownership change 27.0364 13.486** 23.776 12.724* 
Age -8.5144 5.586 -8.764 5.031* 
Age-squared 0.1184 0.072 0.122 0.065* 
Constant 190.1867 104.640* 197.496 94.333** 
N   6449   6449 
R2   0.178   0.185 
Root MSE   91.511   86.540 
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Table 1.25 Micro Mobility Results for One-year Household Income 
Change from 2003-2005 (Cohort A & B & C) 
Variable One-year income change One-year income change with IPW    
Lagged income -0.371 0.055*** -0.354 0.049*** 
2nd Quartile 6.374 4.368 8.759 4.138** 
3rd Quartile 22.342 7.172*** 25.740 6.632*** 
4th Quartile 58.925 14.265*** 60.663 13.014*** 
Cohort A2 (Bubble) 5.388 5.862 3.414 5.435 
Cohort B 4.496 9.158 1.361 8.707 
Cohort C 4.928 13.832 1.443 13.346 
Tech college 2.692 3.839 1.079 3.361 
Junior college 6.588 4.213 1.187 3.349 
University 20.416 5.326*** 15.277 5.029*** 
Lower middle parent's wage 8.255 3.166*** 9.434 2.763** 
Upper middle parent's wage 6.950 5.190 9.287 5.381* 
Upper parent's wage 11.421 5.543** 13.741 5.660** 
Marital status change 38.963 13.824*** 46.813 12.392*** 
Family member change -34.313 5.500*** -34.669 7.726*** 
Employment status change -4.458 4.895 -6.279 4.239 
Region change 6.611 6.565 5.124 6.326 
Living condition change 34.574 15.915** 25.264 16.146 
Housing ownership change 25.130 13.548* 24.713 12.636* 
Age -6.014 6.102 -9.914 6.082 
Age-squared 0.090 0.080 0.138 0.080* 
Constant 138.872 118.024 212.800 116.702* 
N   3149   3149 
R2   0.179   0.182 
Root MSE   86.620   75.422 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1 % level 
 
6. Conclusion 
   Household income per capita mobility is measured by the six different 
methods; mobility as time dependence, positional movement, share movement, 
non-directional movement, directional movement, and mobility as an equalizer 
of long-term incomes. The data set is from the Japanese Panel Survey of 
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Consumers (JPSC) conducted by the Institution for Research on Household 
Economics (IRHE). Although the samples were chosen randomly, the data set 
did not necessarily represent the whole Japanese society at that time. This is 
because the data set has three cohorts and the each cohort consists of young 
women only. The data is panel and it is likely to have attrition bias. In fact the 
household income per capita in cohort A is significantly different between the 
remaining samples and the attritors. Consequently, the inverse probability 
weighting (IPW) was used to adjust the bias from attrition.  
At the macro level, the household income per capita mobility became 
lower in the long-run as a whole. The structure of labor market changed, and 
more and more people had been hired as non-regular staff. The non-regular 
staff wages had been stable but when the economy improved, the companies 
hired many non-regular staff. However, once the economy contracted, they 
could easily reduce the number of non-regular staff, which reflected the 
change in unemployment rate. Thus, when the change in GDP growth rate is 
large, the income of households who had non-regular staff may fluctuate.  
When the macro mobility is observed by series of categories, various 
aspects of mobility are captured. By education, the groups of people who had 
higher education had more mobility in household incomes within a group than 
people who had lower education. Similarly, the household income of the 
people whose parents earned larger incomes fluctuates more within the group 
than those whose parents earned less wages. This indicates that when people 
had more choices regarding their life styles, the income within those groups 
had more dynamism compared with the group of people who had limited 
alternatives. Also, the same principle can be applied to the macro mobility by 
cohort. The people who started their career before the bubble economy had 
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less choices regarding their careers than the people who found their jobs 
during the bubble economy. Thus, the bubble cohort had more mobility on 
their household incomes than the pre-bubble cohort.  
As for the quartile of initial incomes did not have significant difference in 
household income per capita across their groups. All groups had high mobility 
than other categories. This means that their future incomes could not be 
predicted based on their initial incomes. This is because the samples were 
women and in their 20s in the base year. Since the people who had a lower 
education started their jobs earlier than those who had a higher education, 
their wages in their 20s might be higher or equal to the higher educated 
people. However, usually the wages of higher educated people exceeds lower 
educated people’s wages in their 30s. Consequently, in this case, the initial 
wages of people in their 20s might not be a good indicator to capture the 
factors to decide the difference in the future income.        
Micro mobility profiles show that people whose initial household income 
quartile was higher tended to have a lower mean and a higher standard 
deviation of one-year household income changes. By cohort, the cohort 
composed of younger people had a higher standard deviation of one-year 
income change.  Also, the standard deviation of the higher educated people 
tended to be larger, and as parent’s income level got higher, people’s one-
year household income change became larger.  
Unconditional micro income mobility indicates that it is possible for the 
poorer people to catch up with the richer people. Then, conditional micro 
income mobility also indicates that there existed conditional convergence. 
People who had higher initial income had larger positive changes in the one-
year household. Also the higher educated people experienced a larger 
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increase in one-year household income per capita. When the people started to 
live with others who had higher wages; their husbands or their parents, the 
household income rose. On the other hand, the increase in the number of 
dependents reduced the household income per capita. 
Therefore, at a macro level, the household income per capita mobility 
had been decreasing. However, from a micro point of view, some people who 
had some specific characteristics experienced expansion of their household 
income. Whereas, household income of others might decrease. Micro income 
mobility models also indicate that there existed conditional convergence.           
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CHAPTER 2  
HOUSEHOLD SAVING IN JAPAN  
 
1. Introduction 
It has been said that Japan’s household savings provided the funds for 
investment that led to the high growth rate of its economy from the mid-1950s 
to mid-1970s. In fact, until the mid-1970s, the aggregate household saving 
rate in Japan had been increasing and reached 23 percent at its peak (Figure 
2.1). This rate was very high when compared with other countries. Fumio 
Hayashi (1986), who analyzed this high saving rate in Japan, concluded that 
four main factors - insensitivity of the aggregate saving rate to demographics, 
the possibility of significant flow of intergeneration transfers, insignificance of 
the social security dummy, and prevalence of the extended family - led to the 
high household saving rate in Japan. However, according to the National 
Accounts of Japan, since the mid-1970s, Japan’s national saving rate has 
been decreasing drastically and this trend seems to be continuing. In 2006, 
the aggregated saving rate dropped to 3.3 percent.  In recent years, enterprise 
saving has been increasing and instead of households and the government, 
they have provided capital for investment (Figure 2.2). Capital also can be 
obtained from abroad and the actors who would like to invest do not encounter 
serious liquidity constraints in Japan. However, depending too much on 
foreign countries for capital causes vulnerability. Thus, it is important to 
analyze how household saving rate pattern has been changing. 
Of the many papers which deal with the recent Japanese saving rate, 
some showed that the combined effects of demographics and slower total 
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factor productivity growth explained the decline in the saving rate (Braun, 
Ikeda, Joines, 2004).  In addition to these factors, Chen, Imrohoro˘glu, and 
˙Imrohoro˘glu (2007) indicated that fiscal policy also influenced the saving rate. 
One paper emphasized that diversity in saving behavior was important in 
determining household saving in Japan (Campbell, 2004). Horioka (1997) 
mentioned that the age structure of the population had an impact on Japan’s 
saving rate and the life cycle model could be applied to Japan.  Koga (2006) 
also found that demographic factors were a major cause of the sharp decline 
in the Japanese saving rate in the 1990s. 
Referring to Horioka’s paper, several claims need to be checked. One 
is whether or not the life cycle model can explain the trend of the aggregate 
household saving in Japan. According to Horioka (1997), one of the most 
powerful tests of the life cycle model is to test whether the age structure of the 
population has the hypothesized effects on the saving rate. This paper will 
provide an analysis of how the age structure of the population influences the 
household saving rate in Japan by applying cointegration techniques to time 
series data for 1955-2006. The results will show whether the life cycle model 
can still be applied to Japan and whether the changes in Japan’s saving rate 
were the result of the changes in the age structure of its population (Figure 2.3 
and 2.4).  
Investigation into the aggregated household savings is not enough to 
realize the changes in saving rate. A household survey also needs to be 
examined to understand the factors which bring about the decrease in saving 
patterns. For the most part, past papers did not use household-level panel 
data but used repeated cross section data. Thus, in this paper, the household-
level panel data will be used to investigate the characteristics of the household 
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saving behavior and whether the life cycle model can be applied to the 
individual household saving behavior. By using the micro panel data, the 
changes in saving rates with age, year of birth of the head of household, and 
time will be investigated, applying a variant of the decomposition in Deaton 
and Paxson (1994). In their paper, they examined issues of life-cycle saving, 
growth, and aging in Taiwan with the repeated cross section household data 
from 1976 through 1990.  
One of the interesting expected results from this decomposition will be 
people’s saving pattern over their lifetime.  Another interesting result from the 
decomposition will indicate whether there remains a substantial time trend in 
household saving rates. Education, welfare service and housing might be 
related to saving behavior. Recently the fertility rate in Japan has been falling 
and the number of children per household has been decreasing. It is likely that 
parents do not need to save money for their children’s education. For an aging 
society like Japan, welfare benefits such as health care and pensions, have 
been enhanced and the risk for the future seems to be reduced. However, 
people are doubtful about whether the existing system will be sustainable in 
the future. Thus, the welfare services may have an ambiguous effect on 
household saving.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
a macro data investigation with time series analysis, section 3 deals with the 
panel data, and section 4 reviews the results and suggests some policy 
implications. 
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Figure 2.1 Aggregate Household Saving Rate and GDP Growth Rate 
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Figure 2.2 Contribution to Gross Domestic Savings  
as a percentage of GDP 
 
2. Macro Data Analysis 
2.1 Model 
 According to the life cycle model, people work and save income when 
they are young. Then, when they retire, they do not continue saving. Thus, 
when the ratio of the aged population to the productive-age population is high, 
the aggregate saving rate will be low. Similarly, those who have not started 
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working yet, i.e. children, consume but do not obtain income, and accordingly 
the ratio of the child population to the productive-age population will also have 
a negative impact on the aggregate saving rate. With the assumption that (i) 
people start working when they are S years old, work for P years, retire at age 
R, and die at age D, (ii) consumption and income are independent of age, (iii) 
there is no productivity growth, (iv) there are no bequests or other 
intergenerational transfers, and that the interest rate is zero, it can be shown, 
using Horioka’s (1997) model, that the aggregate saving rate SR will be as 
follows: 
 
AGE
D
PCHI
D
P
D
RSSR ⋅−⋅−+= ,                                                           (1) 
 
where CHI  = ratio of child population to productive-age population, AGE  = 
ratio of aged population to productive-age population. 
 In other words, the aggregate saving rate will decrease with respect to 
both CHI  and AGE , and the coefficients of these variables will be negative. In 
addition, the result that SR  decreases with respect to CHI  and AGE  does not 
change even when the assumptions mentioned above are excluded. Thus, in 
the empirical analysis, SR  is specified as a function of CHI  and AGE  except 
that, as an approximation, CHI is defined as the ratio of child population to 
productive-age population and AGE  as the ratio of aged population to 
productive-age population.  
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2.2 Data 
 The dependent variable is the net saving rate of the household sector, 
which is defined as the ratio of net household savings to net household 
disposable income. The data necessary for the computation of this variable 
were obtained from the National Accounts (NA) of Japan, which the Cabinet 
Office of the Government of Japan compiles based on the System of the 
National Accounts (SNA) recommended by the United Nations. Net household 
saving and net household disposable income are based on historical cost 
depreciation and are exclusive of capital transfers in NA. According to Horioka 
(1995), theoretically, the data based on replacement cost depreciation and 
inclusive of capital transfers are preferred. Horioka defined the household 
sector broadly, which included private unincorporated nonfinancial enterprises 
and private nonprofit institutions. However, in this paper, the household sector 
is defined more narrowly. In fact, the correlation between the data from NA 
and that revised by Horioka is very high (0.9837). This paper will use the 
household data from NA directly.        
 Population data were obtained from the Report on Population Estimates 
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication of the Government of 
Japan. Census data were used for years ending in 0 or 5, and official 
estimates were used for all other years. Data on SR , CHI  and AGE for the 
1955-2006 period are shown in the appendix with their means and standard 
deviations. Trends over time in SR , CHI  and AGE  can be seen from figure 
2.A respectively. As figure 2.A.1 shows, SR  indicates a humped pattern, 
increasing until the mid-1970s and then declining. Regarding the demographic 
variables, CHI declined sharply until the early 1970s and then more 
moderately, while AGE  increased moderately until the early 1970s and then 
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more sharply. Thus, assuming that both CHI  and AGE  had a negative impact 
on SR , they appeared capable of explaining the trends over time in SR . The 
sharp decline in CHI  until the early 1970s explains the upward trend in SR  
during this period, and the sharp increase in AGE  since the mid-1970s 
explained the downward trend in SR  during this period.   
 
2.3 Time Series Analysis 
2.3.1 Time Series Properties of the Data 
 First, the time series properties of the data were examined with 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results are given in table 2.1, and 
as this table shows, the saving rate variables had a unit root in their levels and 
were stationary in their first differences, so they were )1(I . Although CHI  and 
AGE  were found to be )2(I , because the null hypothesis of a unit root in their 
first differences was accepted by a relatively small margin, all variables could 
be assumed to be )1(I . 
 
2.3.2 Tests of Cointegration 
Next, based on the results of ADF tests, a cointegrating relationship 
among the three variables SR , CHI , and AGE  was tested with Johansen 
methods. The results are given in table 2.2. As this table shows, the Johansen 
method found that the hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship was strongly 
rejected. It could be concluded that there was a cointegrating relationship 
among SR , CHI , and AGE . 
 With respect to the number of cointegrating equations, the Johansen 
method found that the null hypothesis of at most one cointegration equation 
was rejected, whereas the null hypothesis of at most two cointegration 
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equations was not rejected. In light of these results, it was assumed that there 
were two cointegrating equations. 
 
2.3.3 Estimate of the Cointegrating Vectors 
  Then, the cointegrating vectors, which described the long-run 
relationship among the variables, were discussed. Johansen maximum 
likelihood estimates of the cointegrating vectors are given in table 2.3. As this 
table shows, AGE  had a negative impact on SR , as predicted by the life cycle 
model. Moreover, the coefficient of the variable, AGE , varies relatively little, 
with the coefficient ranging from 2.23 to 3.87. However, the coefficient of CHI  
was equal to zero, which was not consistent with the life cycle theory. The 
simplified life cycle model presented in this section predicts that coefficients of 
the two variables will be equal to one another and less than 1 in absolute 
value, but the coefficient of AGE  was larger than the coefficient of CHI , and it 
was also larger than 1. Moreover, this finding that the coefficient of AGE  was 
larger than the coefficient of CHI  could be explained by the fact that the per 
capita consumption of minors was likely to be less than per capita 
consumption of the aged. Finally, note that the coefficients of CHI  and AGE  
were statistically significant. 
 
2.3.4 Estimates of the Error-Correction Model 
 Given the finding that SR , CHI , and AGE  were cointegrated, an error-
correction model (ECM) was estimated to determine the short-run dynamics of 
the system. The results are given in table 2.4, and as this table shows, the 
coefficient of the error-correction term was negative and statistically significant 
in the saving rate equation, meaning not only that the ECM was valid but also 
 80 
that there was a significant conservative force tending to bring the model back 
into equilibrium whenever it strayed too far. Moreover, the results of the 
diagnostic tests indicate that the saving rate equation passed the tests for 
serial correlation, functional form, and heteroskedasticity, but violated the 
normality. The other equations failed the tests for serial correlation, functional 
form, and normality in some cases. However, the violation was not so 
significant and the saving rate was mainly focused, so no additional 
adjustment was conducted here.   
 
2.3.5 Estimates of Impulse Response Functions 
 In this subsection, estimates of impulse response functions based on 
the ECM of the previous subsection will be presented. These impulse 
response functions show the impact of changes in the age structure of the 
population on the household saving rate. Selected results are given in 2.5 and 
figure 2.3. As this table shows, a 1 percentage point increase in CHI  and 
AGE  seemed to have a permanent impact on SR .  First, the shock of CHI  
had a negative impact on SR  and then, it had positive impacts on SR , turning 
back to negative. This could be explained by the fact that if people have more 
children, they start to save money for their education, which results in the 
increase in saving rate. However, the education fees will exceed their saving 
after a while. On the other hand, people of retirement age and above continue 
to consume with less income and this has a negative impact on the saving rate 
permanently. 
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2.3.6 Results 
In this section, it was found, by applying cointegration techniques to 
time series data on Japan for the 1955-2006 period, that the age structure of 
the population affected household saving in Japan to some degree. It has 
been said that the life cycle model was less likely to apply to Japan due to 
cultural peculiarities, such as the greater prevalence of intergenerational 
transfers (Hayashi, 1986). This still seemed to be true.  
It was found that the ratio of the aged to the working age population 
had a negative and significant impact on the household saving rate. This 
finding constitutes strong evidence in favor of the life-cycle model. However, 
the impact of the ratio of the minor to the working age population on saving 
rate seemed ambiguous. It will have a both negative and positive impact on 
the saving rate. It is not consistent with other types of evidence concerning the 
applicability of the life-cycle model to Japan. The findings suggest that Japan’s 
high household saving rate might have been due in part to the young age 
structure of the population and that the household saving rate might decline as 
the population ages.   
As a whole, only the age structure of the population did not seem to 
explain the change in the household saving rate in Japan. In fact, based on 
the SNA, although the worker’s household saving rate stayed at the same 
level (Figure 2.7), the non occupation household saving rate has dropped 
sharply (Figure 2.8), which indicates that people’s saving behavior might have 
changed recently. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the household level 
saving behavior to understand what has happened to the household saving. 
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Table 2.1 Results of ADF Test 
Variable Type of Test 
Without 
Trend 
5% Critical 
Value 
With 
Trend 
5% Critical 
Value 
SR ADF(0) 0.549 -2.929 -1.164 -3.499 
  ADF(1) 0.082 -2.930 -1.216 -3.500 
  ADF(2) -0.200 -2.933 -1.462 -3.504 
D_SR ADF(0) -5.434 -2.930 -6.035 -3.500 
  ADF(1) -3.755 -2.933 -4.444 -3.504 
  ADF(2) -3.213 -2.936 -4.129 -3.508 
D2_SR ADF(0) -10.951 -2.933 -10.827 -3.504 
  ADF(1) -7.206 -2.936 -7.121 -3.508 
  ADF(2) -5.917 -2.938 -5.855 -3.512 
CHI ADF(0) -5.934 -2.929 -3.118 -3.499 
  ADF(1) -1.769 -2.930 -2.249 -3.500 
  ADF(2) -2.057 -2.933 -2.155 -3.504 
D_CHI ADF(0) -2.339 -2.930 -2.620 -3.500 
  ADF(1) -2.654 -2.933 -3.087 -3.504 
  ADF(2) -2.125 -2.936 -2.545 -3.508 
D2_CHI ADF(0) -6.171 -2.933 -6.115 -3.504 
  ADF(1) -5.578 -2.936 -5.512 -3.508 
  ADF(2) -5.242 -2.938 -5.158 -3.512 
AGE ADF(0) 21.363 -2.929 4.572 -3.499 
  ADF(1) 4.600 -2.930 3.007 -3.500 
  ADF(2) 4.046 -2.933 3.147 -3.504 
D_AGE ADF(0) -0.539 -2.930 -3.783 -3.500 
  ADF(1) 0.071 -2.933 -2.912 -3.504 
  ADF(2) 0.326 -2.936 -2.433 -3.508 
D2_AGE ADF(0) -9.218 -2.933 -9.242 -3.504 
  ADF(1) -6.182 -2.936 -6.214 -3.508 
  ADF(2) -5.684 -2.938 -5.765 -3.512 
 
Table 2.2 Johansen Test for Cointegration 
Maximum 
Rank 
Trace 
Statistics 
Critical 
Value 
0 57.95 29.68 
1 18.96 15.41 
2 2.87 3.76 
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Table 2.3 Estimates of the Cointegrating Vectors 
Cointegration Equation 1 Coefficient SE 
SR 1  -------------- 
CHI 5.55E-17  -------------- 
AGE 3.032 0.411 
Constant -49.954 --------------  
Cointegration Equation 2 Coefficient SE 
SR Dropped  -------------- 
CHI 1  -------------- 
AGE -7.342 1.935 
Constant 4.991  -------------- 
 
Table 2.4 Estimates for ECM 
  D_SR D_CHI D_AGE 
Z1(-1) -0.474 0.122 0.017 
  -3.94 2.77 1.34 
Z2(-1) -0.121 0.020 -0.001 
  -4.02 1.77 -0.23 
D_SR(-1) 0.350 -0.096 -0.009 
  2.47 -1.84 -0.63 
D_SR(-2) 0.215 -0.038 0.010 
  1.49 -0.71 0.68 
D_CHI(-1) -0.146 0.818 0.051 
  -0.36 5.44 1.20 
D_CHI(-2) 0.912 -0.262 -0.059 
  2.30 -1.80 -1.42 
D_AGE(-1) -0.221 -1.319 0.155 
  -0.14 -2.35 0.97 
D_AGE(-2) 0.496 -1.053 -0.108 
  0.29 -1.69 -0.61 
Constant -0.009 -0.050 0.116 
  -0.02 -0.27 2.21 
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Table 2.5 Impulse Response Functions 
  CHI AGE 
1 -0.091 -0.079 
2 0.098 -0.061 
3 0.244 -0.129 
4 0.240 -0.264 
5 0.078 -0.332 
6 -0.107 -0.276 
7 -0.221 -0.151 
8 -0.251 -0.048 
9 -0.240 -0.008 
10 -0.226 -0.016 
15 -0.252 -0.069 
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Figure 2.3 Ratio of Child Population to Productive-Age Population 
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Figure 2.4 Ratio of Aged Population to Productive-Age Population 
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Figure 2.5 Impulse response function of child population on saving rate 
 
Figure 2.6 Impulse response function of aged population on saving rate 
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Figure 2.7 Worker's Household Saving Rate 
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Figure 2.8 Non Occupation Household Saving Rate 
 
3. Decomposition Analysis 
This paper estimates how saving rates vary according to time, age, and 
cohort of the household head, using a variant of decomposition in Deaton and 
Paxson (1994). This study found the traditional “hump-shaped” profile of 
savings over the life cycle of an individual where saving rates were at their low 
when people were young but achieved their peak when the earning potential 
was the highest and then fell off as workers approached retirement. This 
relationship between age and saving rates differs from what previous studies 
had said about household saving in Japan. Demographic shifts did not go far 
enough to explain saving behavior. Even after broader demographic shifts 
were under control, there remained a substantial trend over time in household 
saving rates, implying that the falling saving rates must be the result of 
economy-wide changes affecting all households. As with most other studies 
using household data, very limited consumption smoothing over the life cycle 
was found.  
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 The overall macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the recession 
in the 1990s should have contributed to precautionary saving motives. 
However, strong evidence was not found that the effects of macro uncertainty 
were quantitatively important.  
  The target saving hypothesis is also investigated, according to which 
households have a target level of saving. Since bank deposits are the primary 
financial assets for Japanese households, their saving rates should be then 
negatively correlated with real returns on bank deposits if this theory is correct.  
       After examining the empirical relevance of various hypotheses 
individually in the next section, in section 5, it was estimated that a composite 
regression to evaluate the relative importance of the most promising ones was 
necessary. It was found that savings were also higher for households whose 
composition portends large education expenditure in the future. These and 
other strands of evidence suggest that precautionary motives and the rising 
burden of social expenditure drove the increase in household saving rates. In 
the composition regression, the effects of home ownership status on savings 
were somewhat negative on average, although it was not found that owners of 
poor-quality homes had higher saving rates than those with better homes. It 
was also found that owing a home was associated with lower saving rates 
among young households. All of these effects were amplified in an 
environment of financial restrictions, which resulted in the lack of instruments 
for borrowing against any future income, limited opportunities for portfolio 
diversification, and low real returns on bank deposits.  
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3.1 Data 
The Institution for Research on Household Economics designed, 
implemented and analyzed the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) 
with a focus on changing lifestyles. This employed the panel research method 
to track the same individuals over multiple periods of time. Cohort A consisted 
of a group of young women aged between 24 and 34 who were randomly 
selected from across Japan in 1993 for an in-home questionnaire survey. 
Cohort B, consisting of women aged between 24 and 27 in 1997, and cohort C, 
consisting of women aged between 24 and 29 in 2003, were added 
respectively in 1997 and 2003. The relatively high response rate of this annual 
survey overcame the inherent disadvantages of a panel survey. They 
designed, implemented and analyzed this research project with a focus on 
changing lifestyles. Many of the people selected as participants in the study 
were at an age where their previously similar lifestyle paths begin to branch 
out and diversify. The objective of this study was to identify various factors and 
problems associated with the changes and differences in the lifestyles of the 
study participants.  
The measure of disposable income included labor income, property 
income, transfers, and income from household sideline production. The 
consumption expenditure variable covered a broad range of categories. It also 
provided demographic and employment information about household 
members, living conditions, and a number of other household characteristics. 
Table 2.6 reports summary statistics for household income, consumption, loan, 
and the resulting saving rates. The table describes the changes in the 
distribution of consumption across different groups of goods. Neither income 
nor consumption measures captured the consumption value of owner-
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occupied housing. All flow variables were expressed on an annual basis and, 
nominal variables were adjusted using the CPI. 
A potential concern at this juncture was that the micro data indicated 
household saving rates different from those suggested by the aggregate data 
taken from the National Survey of Accounts. The discrepancies between micro 
and macro data on saving ratios are an issue in almost every country where 
both types of data are available. Perhaps more importantly, it is usually difficult 
to get adequate survey response rates from high-income households. These 
households tend to have high saving propensities. The shares of total saving 
accounted for by each income decile showed that the top decile accounts for 
over one-fourth of total savings. The increase in saving rates was also more 
pronounced among the richer households. Thus, an under-sampling of rich 
households could understate average savings.     
Figure 2.9 compares the average worker’s household saving rate from 
a family income and expenditure survey compiled by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications of the Government of Japan and the mean 
household saving rate from JPSC data. It indicates that both data had similar 
tendencies and the JPSC data was reliable. The relationship between saving 
rate and the age of household heads is shown in figure 2.17. According to this 
figure, the household saving rate increased from their early 20’s and reached 
its peak during their 40’s. Then it started to go down. The data seem to be 
consistent with the life-cycle theory and this will be checked a later section. 
 
3.2 Stylized fact 
    A basic empirical characterization of saving patterns based on the 
micro data is mentioned. Figure 2.11- 2.14 shows, for selected years from 
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1993 to 2005, averages of disposable income and consumption as a function 
of the age of the household head. There was little change in average income 
over this period, with consumption following income. The age profiles of 
income (Figure 2.11-2.14) exhibit a familiar hump-shaped pattern in all 
selected periods. That is, income initially increased with age but, after peaking 
several years before their retirement, began to decline. Interestingly, the peak 
was getting later and moved from the late 40s in 1993 to the early-50s in 2005. 
This might be related to the fact that their retirement age was becoming older. 
This phenomenon of rising retirement age is typical for an aging society. 
Figure 2.23 plots income and consumption against the age of the household 
head, with each line corresponding to a different cohort. This figure shows that 
consumption tracked income over the life cycle across cohorts, confirming the 
lack of consumption smoothing over the life cycle. Controlling the demographic 
characteristics of households does not alter the consumption profiles, which 
still increased substantially over time. Figure 2.24 plots the saving rate as a 
function of the age of the head of household in the panel data of households 
for 1993, 1997, and 2003. In 1993, the age-saving profile exhibits a hump-
shaped pattern, with the saving rate increasing with age, peaking at around 
age 40, and then declining with age. Such behavior is close to what life-cycle 
theory would predict, given borrowing constraints that limit borrowing against 
future income and rising labor earnings over certain ranges of the working life. 
This pattern did not change over all periods, and the slope of decline curb was 
even steeper than income, meaning that household consumption did not 
decrease as much as income.  
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    The cohort, age and time effects and their roles in saving behavior was 
separately discussed. In this section, econometric approach is used to 
disentangle these effects. 
 
3.3 Model 
As mentioned above, Japan is undergoing a major demographic 
transition. The low fertility rate and the increase in the number of elderly have 
increased the old-age dependency ratio and are projected to increase it further 
in coming years. Hence, a more careful analysis of demographic factors 
seems warranted in accounting for the decline in the savings ratio. 
The age and cohort profiles of household savings represent a 
composite of age, cohort, and time effects. Different age and cohort groups 
are likely to have had different saving behavior and these are likely to change 
over time. It is therefore necessary to separate out age, cohort and time 
effects in order to more clearly characterize the effects of demographic 
variation on changes in saving patterns. The contribution of these effects to 
savings is decomposed by adapting the approach of Deaton and Paxson 
(1994). 
If there is no income uncertainty, the life-cycle model indicates that 
consumption is a function of wealth, earnings plus inherited assets, as dictated 
by preferences and the life-cycle variation in household size and composition. 
Based on Deaton’s model, 
 
Wagc )(= ,                                                                                             (2) 
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where W  is the sum of assets and the discounted present value of current and 
expected future income, and )(ag  is a function of age a . Appling logarithm 
gives, 
 
Wagc ln)(lnln += .                                                                             (3) 
 
The extension (3) is to allow for fixed year effects, so the consumption 
equation becomes 
 
tbat Wagc θ++= ln)(lnln ,                                                                     (4) 
 
where tθ   is a year-long fixed effect, and the subscripts a , b , and t  denote 
age, cohort, and time, respectively.  
 The estimation (4) requires care regarding the relationship between age, 
cohort, and year dummies. Using C , Y  and A , for the matrices of the dummy 
variables of cohort, year and age dummies. Equation (4) can be rewritten in 
terms of the dummy variable matrices as 
 
cccccat YACc εψαγιβ ++++=ln ,                                                       (5) 
 
where ι   is a vector of units, and the vectors cα , cγ , and cψ  are parameters 
of age, cohort, and year effects.   
 Since age minus cohort equals year plus a constant, in the absence of 
constraints on these dummies any trend could be the result of different 
combinations of year, age, and cohort effects. Deaton and Paxson (1994) 
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identify age and cohort effects by imposing the constraint that the year effects 
must add up to zero and be orthogonal to a time trend.  
 
 0=∑
t
cψ  and 0=∑
t
ctψ  
 
This constraint forces the decomposition to attribute the rising income and 
consumption over time to age and cohort effects, overwhelming most of the 
other variation in consumption and saving behavior.  
If the age profile of income is invariant to economic growth, then income 
can also be expressed as a function of age and lifetime resources. An 
equation for disposable income that is analogous to the one for consumption is 
estimated as follows: 
 
yyyyyat YACy εψαγιβ ++++=ln ,                                                      (6) 
 
where ι   is a vector of units, and the vectors yα , yγ , and yψ  are parameters 
of age, cohort, and year effects. Once the effects of a variable on consumption 
and income are estimated, then its resulting effect on the household saving 
rate can be obtained. When   these equations are estimated, the following 
demographic controls are included: log family size and the proportion of 
individuals in the household aged: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-59 and 60 or 
above. 
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3.4 Age, Cohort and Time Effects in Household Saving Rates 
In order to check how the life cycle mode fits the case in Japan, 
equation (5) is estimated with 47 age dummy variables, 13 year dummy 
variables and 5 cohort dummy variables based on the following categorization. 
Figure 2.25-2.27 show the estimated age and cohort profiles of income, 
consumption and saving rates. The profile for one type of effect assumes that 
the others are kept constant. The baseline household is one whose head was 
25 years old in 1993. For example, the age profile shows how income and 
consumption would vary with age holding the cohort effect constant at the 
level for the cohort 1 and the year effect at its 1993 level. Similarly, the cohort 
profile shows how income and consumption would vary with year of birth 
holding the age effect constant at its level for 25 year olds and the year effect 
at its 1993 level. Finally, the year profile indicates the variation over time 
holding the age effect constant at its level for 25 year olds and the cohort 
effect at the level of those born in 1965. 
The results reveal that consumption tended to track income. The age 
effects show that income and consumption increased until the age of early 50s, 
and then declined. The implied effect on the saving rate, approximated as log 
(Y) – log (C), was similar to the saving rate profile as a function of age 
observed in the panel until the age of early 50s. It indicates that households 
saved more as they got older, but then the saving rates gradually declined. 
This hump-shaped pattern of savings is typical but is different from what the 
previous studies suggest. It is also consistent with the life cycle/permanent 
income hypothesis.  
The cohort profiles of income, consumption suggested that younger 
cohorts had relatively higher incomes than those cohorts who were in their late 
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30s and early 40s in 1993. The resulting effect on savings suggested that the 
higher saving cohorts were those that were in their 30s in 1993. This may be 
capturing the fact that those younger cohorts might have born the brunt of the 
increase in uncertainty associated with the shrinking in pension funds under 
the aging society after high economic growth. The sharp increase in the saving 
rate in the later working years was also consistent with postponing retirement 
savings until retirement was near. It is worth noting that cohorts that were in 
their forties in 1993, arguably the ones most affected by the high economic 
growth in the early 1970s, were not high saving cohorts. Finally, the time 
profile is analyzed. The time effects pointed to both upward and downward 
trends in income and consumption. The time effects on saving rates reached 
their peak in 1997, which saw the financial crisis in Asia, and 2001, which saw 
the collapse of the IT bubble. This suggests large negative impacts 
encouraged people to reduce their consumption and expand their saving. 
 
 
Table 2.6 Summary Statistics 
Year Observations Income  
Consumpti
on Loan Household 
size 
Saving 
Rate (1993 
1000yen) 
(1993 
1000yen) 
(1993 
1000yen) 
1993           1,013  288 192 33 4.17 0.21 
1994           1,039  306 198 38 4.24 0.22 
1995           1,035  321 204 44 4.27 0.22 
1996           1,041  324 205 46 4.27 0.22 
1997           1,290  309 196 44 4.12 0.21 
1998           1,274  326 210 45 4.14 0.20 
1999           1,238  330 215 47 4.17 0.19 
2000           1,222  338 220 48 4.20 0.19 
2001           1,065  347 222 53 4.15 0.19 
2002           1,066  356 234 52 4.18 0.18 
2003           1,439  333 224 48 3.87 0.17 
2004           1,412  344 230 49 3.92 0.17 
2005           1,381  350 239 48 3.93 0.17 
Total         15,515  329 216 46 4.11 0.19 
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Table 2.7 Type of Employment for Household Heads (%)  
Occupation 1993 1997 2003 2005 
Agriculture 0.35 0.09 0.94 1.12 
Fishery 0.35 0.18 0.29 0.37 
Mining 0.69 0.36 0.07 0.15 
Construction 13.31 13.54 14.35 14.21 
Production 26.16 23.92 22.54 23.59 
Sales 15.28 17.06 16.01 15.85 
Finance 7.06 6.95 5.72 5.21 
Transportation 8.91 8.12 8.77 8.48 
Utility 2.31 2.08 1.81 1.56 
Service 15.74 16.34 19.86 21.21 
Public 9.72 11.28 9.28 8.18 
Others 0.12 0.09 0.36 0.07 
 
 
Table 2.8 Breakdown of Consumption Expenditure 
Year  Food Housing Health 
Education 
and 
Recreation 
Transportation 
and 
Communication 
Other 
1998 26.3 19.2 3.3 15.5 6.6 29.1 
1999 27.2 18.6 3.0 15.0 11.0 25.2 
2000 26.9 18.9 2.6 15.2 11.0 25.4 
2001 25.9 19.5 4.8 18.6 12.5 29.5 
2002 26.1 19.1 2.6 17.2 12.6 27.5 
2003 27.1 25.1 4.8 20.5 16.4 31.7 
2004 24.6 20.0 3.8 18.0 13.8 29.6 
2005 24.1 20.9 4.0 17.7 14.3 27.8 
 
Table 2.9 Categorization of Cohorts 
Cohort Age in 1993 
1 - 24 
2 25 - 29 
3 30 - 34 
4 35 - 39 
5 40 - 
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Figure 2.9 Comparison of two Household Surveys 
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Figure 2.10 Saving Rate and Share of Total Savings by Income Quintile
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Figure 2.11 Household Head’s Age and Income in 1993               
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Figure 2.12 Household Head’s Age and Income in 1997 
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      Figure 2.13 Household Head’s Age and Income in 2003          
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Figure 2.14 Household Head’s Age and Income in 2005 
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Figure 2.15 Household Head’s Age and Consumption in 1993 
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Figure 2.16 Household Head’s Age and Consumption in 1997 
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Figure 2.17 Household Head’s Age and Consumption in 2003 
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Figure 2.18 Household Head’s Age and Consumption in 2005 
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Figure 2.19 Household Head’s Age and Saving Rate in 1993     
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Figure 2.20 Household Head’s Age and Saving Rate in 1997 
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Figure 2.21 Household Head’s Age and Saving Rate in 2003 
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Figure 2.22 Household Head’s Age and Saving Rate in 2005 
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Figure 2.23 Income and Consumption for Different Cohorts Over Time 
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Figure 2.24 Average Saving Rates by Age of Head of Household  
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Figure 2.25 Cohort Effect on Income and Consumption     
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Figure 2.26 Age Effect on Income and Consumption 
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Figure 2.27 Year Effect on Income and Consumption  
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Figure 2.28 Cohort Effect on Saving   
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Figure 2.29 Age Effect on Saving 
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Figure 2.30 Year Effect on Saving 
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4. Potential Explanations 
Since demographic shifts related to changes in the relative sizes of 
cohorts did not seem to account for the decrease in household savings, next a 
variety of alternative hypotheses that could account for the deviations from the 
predictions of the traditional life cycle permanent income hypothesis are 
discussed. Some data and preliminary evidence of the quantitative relevance 
of these hypotheses in explaining the patterns are shown. First these 
hypotheses are investigated individually in order to ascertain their empirical 
relevance before turning to a framework that allows us to assess their relative 
importance. 
 
4.1 Habit Formation 
Habit formation implies that consumption reacts slowly to income 
change. This hypothesis has been used to explain why rapidly-growing 
countries have high saving rates but the evidence in favor of the hypothesis is 
weaker when applied to household data. In this paper, it is examined whether 
this hypothesis can explain the low household saving rate after high economic 
growth. Once households are accustomed to expanding their expenditure, it 
might take time for them to reduce the pace even if their wages do not 
increase any further.   
Habit formation implies that current consumption growth is positively 
correlated with past consumption growth. Following Dynan (2000), the 
following equation was examined: 
 
titiititi cc ,,1,, loglog εθγβα ++∆+=∆ −  
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where tic ,log∆  is the log-change in nondurables consumption for household i 
and ti,θ  is a vector of household characteristics. This regression was run using 
the panel of households. The sample was restricted to households whose 
heads were 25-59 years old, and excluded those where the heads were 
unemployed or waiting for an assignment. The following variables were also 
created; the log of nondurables consumption on time dummies interacted with 
dummies for residence; the age of household heads (5-year ranges); 
education, type of ownership of the workplace, sector of  employment, and 
type of occupation of the heads, and demographic controls.  
Table 2.10 presents the estimates for the coefficient on lagged 
consumption growth. The first sample covers the households in the 1998-2002 
surveys for which cohort A and B are available. Initially this regression was 
estimated using OLS, controlling only the levels and changes in demographic 
variables such as age, age squared, the log of household size, and shares of 
household members in different age ranges. The estimated coefficient on 
lagged consumption growth was negative (-0.425). The second sample in 
Table 2.10 covers the households in 2003-2005 for which three cohort 
observations are available. The result was qualitatively similar to those in the 
first sample. That means, when households experienced consumption growth 
above average, it tended to have consumption growth below average in the 
following year, and vice-versa. The results were similar if residence, education 
and time dummies were added as controls. This pattern is the opposite of 
what one would expect in the presence of consumption habits.  
There are two sources of potential bias in these OLS estimates--time 
averaging and measurement error (Chamon and Prasad 2008). If time 
averaging error is properly dealt with, it would presumably increase the 
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absolute magnitude of the negative coefficient on lagged consumption growth, 
which would in fact strengthen the evidence against habit formation. In order 
to address the measurement problem, the third lag of consumption growth is 
used as an instrument for the first lag. Since our second sample only covers 
three years, this specification can be used for the first sample only. 
To summarize, our results suggested that habit formation could not 
account for the saving behavior of households. However, this evidence 
remained only suggestive since measurement problems in consumption could 
be driving these results, and the nature of the data limits our ability to more 
fully address this problem. 
 
4.2 Shifts in Social Expenditure 
Expenditure on education and health were significant parts of 
household consumption. Figure 2.32 shows how the expenditure on health 
and education varied over time for different age groups. Both were stable over 
time. Health expenditure accounted for a certain share of consumption 
expenditure over the age of the household heads. On the other hand, 
education expenditure peaked at around age 50 for the household heads, 
which could help explain low saving rates for that age group.  
Owing to the public health insurance policy basically covering all 
citizens, the risk of health did not seem to be an important factor to change 
saving rates as before. On the other hand, education was still an influential 
factor to decide households’ saving behavior. Since its expenditure was highly 
correlated to the share of children under 20 among all family members, its 
effects could be analyzed interpreting the coefficient of household components 
in the next section. 
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4.3 Durables Purchases and Savings 
Even at present, consumer financing remains limited and controlled in 
Japan. As a result, instead of borrowing against future income to purchase 
durable goods, Japanese households are more likely to rely on their savings. 
This could cause households to postpone purchasing some of those desired 
goods and to save more in the process. The high saving rates among young 
households, in particular, may be driven by the desire to finance purchases of 
major consumer durables at a later date. These expenditure tend to be larger 
for younger households. 
A measure of durables consumption was constructed using the detailed 
information on consumption expenditure available in the JPSC from 1998 to 
2005. A regression of the household saving rate at time t on durable good 
purchases at time t+1 suggested a negligible impact. 
The lack of a relationship between savings and future purchase of 
durable goods was not surprising. On average, Japanese households spent 7 
percent of their disposable incomes on durable goods in 2005. Most 
households could have financed such purchases just by saving less during 
that year, without needing to draw on past savings. Moreover, since a 
significant share of Japanese households’ wealth is in liquid assets such as 
bank deposits, large purchases could be financed by drawing on those liquid 
savings.  
 
4.4 Housing Purchases and Savings 
One of the most important durable goods is housing. Table 2.11 shows 
the average home ownership rate for the households in our sample. The 
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proportion of households that own or partially own their homes increased from 
51 percent in 1993 to 62 percent in 2005. Figure 2.32 plots average home 
ownership rates by age group. The home ownership rate among households 
was higher as their head got older over the study period. This ownership of the 
housing stock could help explain the change in household saving rates over 
age, since home purchase and construction expenditure were considered 
household savings. Table 2.11 also reports the ratio of home purchase and 
construction expenditure to disposable income. 
That ratio of home purchase and construction expenditure to disposable 
income averaged at about 23.7 percent over the ten year period. It is 
estimated how much of those expenditure were financed by depleting past 
savings by computing the average of: 
Min [Housing purchase and construction expenditure, Saving deposit 
withdrawals]. 
If a household did not have any housing purchase or construction 
expenditure in a given year, as is typically the case, this variable would equal 
zero. If the household had positive housing purchase and construction 
expenditure in that year, this variable would equal the lower of that 
expenditure and its savings withdrawals. Thus, this variable shows 
approximately how much of the observed housing purchase and construction 
expenditure could have been financed by saving withdrawals. 
In order to gauge the magnitude of housing-related savings, the ratio of 
this variable including the majority of observations for which its value is zero to 
the average disposable income in that year was taken. This ratio suggested 
that in 1997 aggregate housing purchase related saving withdrawals 
corresponded to about 7.3 percent of aggregate household income, up from 
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3.6 percent in 1994. Of course, that ratio was much higher if households 
reporting non-zero home construction and purchase expenditure were only 
focused on. Due to data restriction, the ratios in other years were not obtained. 
Table 2.11 also reports the ratio of the average repayment of home 
loans with respect to the average income. That ratio was lower in the early 
1990s since many households’ heads were young and had not bought their 
houses yet. Then, the ratio gradually went up and reached its peak in 2001-02 
when many household’s heads were in their 40s.  In comparison with the 
change in this ratio, the ratio of housing loans to average income fluctuated 
less. In general, the Japanese financial institutes link the amount of repayment 
to debtors’ income level. Unfortunately, interest payments amortization of 
principal on those loans could not be separated. 
If home ownership motives were indeed an important contributor to 
savings, the high ownership rates that were attained in their 50s point to a 
decline in saving rates. Indeed, the saving rate declined in the late 40s and 
50s. The empirical implications were explored in the next section. This 
discussion indicates that if households were able to tap their illiquid housing 
wealth, the need for precautionary savings would decline. 
 
4.5 Effects of Employment Type on Saving Behavior 
Changes in precautionary saving due to uncertainties stemming from 
the difference in employment type could potentially help explain the trend in 
saving. The high saving rates among young households may be driven by the 
need to build an adequate buffer stock of savings to smooth adverse shocks to 
their income. This factor could also explain why it was found that the higher 
saving cohorts were those that were in their 30s in 1993. These cohorts bore 
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much of the increase in uncertainty related to the changes in employment 
system and did not benefit from the life-long employment system and more 
non-regular employee positions.  
Regular employment was likely to be more stable so, all else being 
equal, workers employed as a regular staff should save less. In the case of 
Japan, concerns related to the employment system could have contributed to 
an increase in saving rates of households reliant on regular employee income 
relative to other households. An implicit assumption underlying this argument 
is that the relative increase in uncertainty was greater for non-regular 
employees. 
Table 2.12 shows that, among heads of household in the 25-59 age 
range, non-regular workers accounted for 1.9 percent of employment in 1993; 
this share had climbed to 5.9 percent by 2005. Hence, by comparing the 
savings of regular and non-regular households over time, it could be gauged 
whether the shift in employment patterns and the uncertainties could help 
account for the change in saving rates.  
 
4.6 Target Savings 
Another possible explanation for why Japanese household saving rates 
have changed is the target saving hypothesis. The basic idea is that 
households have a target level of saving that they want to achieve by the end 
of their working life, which means that saving rates will tend to be negatively 
correlated with the real returns on savings. This is just a way of restating the 
relative importance of substitution and income effects of changes in interest 
rates on intertemporal consumption decisions. The usual presumption is that 
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the substitution effect dominates, so that a lower real rate of return on savings 
leads to a lower saving rate. 
It is difficult to test this hypothesis using time series data since the span 
of available data is limited and the economy underwent numerous changes 
over the survey periods. It is also difficult to test this at the household level 
since different households may face different rates of return on their savings, 
depending on the composition of their financial wealth. This information is not 
available in our dataset. 
However, the vast majority of household financial savings takes the 
form of bank deposits and, since the deposit rate was closely related to the 
policy target rate, all households faced a similar nominal rate of return on their 
savings. The inflation rate is available only at the national level and in the 
Tokyo area, and those rates have a high correlation and assume the inflation 
rate was the same in Japan. 
In order to investigate the effects of target savings, the log saving was 
regressed on the log of the gap of the difference and between the saving 
target and the current amount of saving, the real interest rate and age. The 
first regression was done with demographics controlled, and the second one 
was done with demographics, residence, and education controlled. In all 
regressions, the saving target gap had positive impacts on the saving rate. 
The saving rate increased by 0.05 to 0.1 percent once the amount of the target 
gap expanded one percent. On the other hand, the target saving rate did not 
have significant effect on the saving rate as previous studies pointed out in 
Japan. 
These results should be interpreted with caution as there were many 
missing data among the samples. Furthermore, by t-test it was revealed that 
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the mean saving rate was significantly different between samples who 
reported their saving target and those who did not. People showing their 
saving targets had higher saving rates than those whose data is missing. 
Therefore, in our samples, it is difficult to say that the target saving hypothesis 
explained the saving behavior of Japanese households. 
 
Table 2.10 Consumption Growth and Habit Formation 
Type Controls 
Coefficient and S.E. 
on Lagged 
Non-durable 
Consumption 
Growth 
Adjusted 
R2 Obs. 
Sample: Cohort A and B (1998-2002) 
OLS Demographics -0.425 0.082 0.207 5169 
OLS Demographics+Year -0.425 0.082 0.207 5169 
IV Demographics+Year -0.083 1.404 0.180 2815 
OLS Demographics+Region+Education+Year -0.425 0.082 0.207 5169 
IV Demographics+Region+Education+Year -0.109 1.434 0.212 2815 
Sample: Cohort A, B and C (2003-2005) 
OLS Demographics -0.252 0.105 0.127 1046 
OLS Demographics+Year -0.252 0.105 0.127 1046 
OLS Demographics+Region+Education+Year -0.251 0.104 0.137 1046 
 
 
 114 
 
Table 2.11 Home Purchase and Construction Expenditure 
Financed by Saving Withdrawals 
Year 
Home  
Ownership  
(%) 
Ave. Home 
Purchase 
Expenditure / 
Ave. Income 
(%) 
Ave. of Min 
(Home 
purchase, 
Saving 
Withdrawals) / 
Ave. Income 
(%) 
Ave. 
Repayment of 
Home Loans / 
Ave. Income 
(%) 
Share of 
Households 
Repaying a 
Home Loan 
(%) 
Ave. Housing 
Loan / Ave. 
Income Among 
Households 
Repaying 
Housing Loan 
(%) 
1993 51.49 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1994 54.62 28.3 3.6 4.6 25.31 16.5 
1995 57.39 N/A N/A 5.6 29.28 17.2 
1996 59.23 N/A N/A 6.3 31.22 18.2 
1997 57.76 44.3 7.3 6.4 30.47 18.1 
1998 58.56 16.9 N/A 7.1 31.95 19.7 
1999 59.61 35.2 N/A 7.0 34.81 17.7 
2000 61.95 18.8 N/A 7.5 36.58 17.7 
2001 64.29 20.7 N/A 8.7 42.16 17.8 
2002 66.45 32.9 N/A 9.7 42.31 20.6 
2003 60.25 19.1 N/A 8.7 36.14 20.0 
2004 61.49 13.1 N/A 7.6 37.32 17.4 
2005 62.36 12.5 N/A 7.9 37.65 17.9 
 
Table 2.12 Employment Type of Household Heads 
Company Size 1993 1997 2003 2005 
Regular worker 98.12 98.68 93.22 94.11 
Non-regular worker 1.88 1.32 6.78 5.89 
 
Table 2.13 Target Saving  
Controls Coefficient and S.E. on Log Target Saving Gap 
Adjusted 
R2 Obs. 
Sample: Cohort A (1993-2005) 
Demographics 0.055 0.017 0.417 1168 
Demographics+Region+Education+Year 0.055 0.017 0.440 1168 
Sample: Cohort A and B (1997-2005) 
Demographics 0.049 0.021 0.420 847 
Demographics+Region+Education+Year 0.052 0.020 0.449 847 
Sample: Cohort A, B and C (2003-2005) 
Demographics 0.087 0.037 0.410 277 
Demographics+Region+Education+Year 0.098 0.039 0.442 277 
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Figure 2.31 Home Ownership by Age of the Head of Household 
Health 1998
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Figure 2.32 Average and Standard Deviation of the Shares of 
Consumption Expenditure on Education and Health as a Function of Age 
of the Head of the Household 
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Figure 2.32 (Continued) 
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5. Composite Sketch 
An estimation framework for jointly analyzing the importance of some of 
the key hypotheses in driving the decrease in the household saving rate was 
developed. The evidence in the last section suggests that the savings for 
durable purchases, consumption persistence due to habit formation, and 
target savings behavior were not major contributors to the saving behavior. 
Hence, the other motives for saving that seem quantitatively most relevant, i.e. 
housing purchases, and the change in employment type, are focused on. 
Education costs were also a very important factor to influence the saving 
behavior, but this was closely related to the household demographics and its 
contribution was examined through the demographic effects.    
Composite median regressions for the household saving rates using the 
following controls were estimated: 
Demographics: The dummies were the age of the heads of household’s 
being 25-29, 30-34, ..., 50-54, and 55-59 years old, the log of the household 
size, and the share of household members aged 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-59, 
and 60 or above. These controls could inform us of how the presence of the 
elderly and children of different ages affected savings, helping us to gauge 
saving motives related to future expenditure on health and education. 
Income: The log of disposable income was included. Dummies for 
education, occupation, industry of the household head, residence and year 
dummies were also included. These dummies could capture the permanent 
income of a household with some given characteristics. Thus, when reading 
the coefficient on log income, one should bear in mind that the estimated 
effect included these other controls. 
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Employment type: This effect was captured by one dummy. The 
variable equals one if the household head was employed as a non-regular 
worker. This specification allowed us to capture possible nonlinearity in the 
effect. 
Home ownership: A dummy equal to one if the household owned its 
dwelling. 
Table 2.14 presents the regression results. To abstract from year-to-
year variations, the results were for the following periods: 1993-96, 1997-2002 
and 2003-05. For each period, the results from a specification including only 
the income, and demographic controls, year and residence dummies were 
presented first. Then a second specification that also controlled employment 
type, and home ownership were investigated.  
It is worth noting that the estimated year dummies, not reported in the 
table for presentation purposes, did not imply any kind of trend.  
The effect of income on the saving rates grew stronger over time. All 
else being equal, a one percent increase in disposable income increased 
saving rates by 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points in 2003-05 up from about 0.2 in 
1993-1996. This higher saving propensity of richer households might seem 
like a promising explanation for the behavior in savings. But one should keep 
in mind that this coefficient was capturing the effect of income after controlling 
a host of household characteristics such as education, occupation, residence, 
year, among others, so one could not simply multiply this coefficient by income 
changes to read an effect on the saving rate. But this rising coefficient does 
suggest that, all else being equal, households tended to save more of the 
idiosyncratic components of their income, which is consistent with stronger 
precautionary saving motives. 
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The age dummies confirm that households with relatively very young or 
very old heads tended to save less, although the magnitude of the difference 
in savings was more muted than the age effects estimated in the last section. 
This suggests other controls might capture the differences by age shown in 
those plots.  
While controls directly related to education expenditure were not 
included, their importance could be gauged by the household composition 
controls. For example, we could compare households with children aged 5-9 
and 10-14 years with those aged 15-19 for which education expenditure tend 
to be higher. All else being equal, the difference in the savings between a 
three person household with one child in the 5-9 age group and one with a 
member in the 15-19 age group in 1993-96 was muted, and it was about 2 
percentage points in 2003-05. If we compare the 10-14 with the 15-19 age 
group, the difference was negligible in 1993-96 and 1.4 percentage points in 
2003-05. This pattern was consistent with higher savings in anticipation of 
future education expenditure. Although households with children tended to 
have savings for the expected education cost, the expenditure seemed to 
exceed their saving because the coefficients of those households were all 
negative.   
As discussed earlier, differentials in saving rates between regular 
workers and non-regular workers were used to tease out the magnitude of 
precautionary motives for saving. Our maintained assumption was that, while 
overall macro uncertainty increased and the level of uncertainty might be 
higher in the private sector, the relative increase in uncertainty was greater for 
non-regular employees. Having a non-regular employee in the household did 
not have a significant impact on the saving rate over all periods. This can 
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suggest that although the household whose head was a non-regular worker 
had more uncertainty in the future, they did not have higher motivation for 
precautionary savings. This might be because the social safety net was good 
and reduced non-regular workers’ fluctuation in their wages. Since the survey 
did not have expected wages when the samples became unemployed, it was 
difficult to analyze the impact of non-regular employment on the saving further.   
Finally, the home ownership dummy was investigated. Households that 
own their homes saved about 1 percentage points more of their income in 
1993-96 and 1997-2002 than those that did not. The sign was the opposite of 
what one would expect based on our contention that households saved for 
house purchases. This effect increased to 2 percent in the 2003-05 sample. 
The first panel of Table 2.15 presented estimates for the same 
regressions as the ones above, but with income and consumption adjusted by 
an estimated value of owner-occupied housing obtained by regressing. For the 
sample of renters, rent expenditure on non-rent consumption expenditure, 
demographic controls, province and non-regular employment dummies were 
adjusted. Then using the fitted values to impute rents for the homeowners 
were adopted. The data was bootstrapped to construct the standard errors. 
Now the effect was minus 2 percentage points for 1998-2002 and minus 1 
percent for 2003-05. Then, dummies for value quartiles by residence and year 
were created. However, any significant difference in coefficients among those 
values was not indicated. 
The effects of home ownership on savings might depend on the age of 
the household heads. For example, a young household head who did not own 
a dwelling was more likely than to be saving to purchase one a 65 year old. 
The second panel of Table 2.15 presents regressions similar to those of the 
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first panel, but with interactions of the home ownership dummy with dummies 
for five year ranges of the age of the household head. Home ownership had a 
negative effect on saving rates in 1998-2002, and the coefficient on the age 
interactions indicates that owing houses reduced the saving rate of young 
households. Home ownership had a positive effect on saving rates in 2003-05 
but it was not significant, and the coefficients on the age interactions were not 
statistically significant, either.  
In that sample, the coefficient on the home ownership dummy was -2.4 
percentage points. The coefficients on its interaction with age were still 
negative, and the combined effect gradually declined from the 25-29 age 
group towards older households. The point estimates imply effects of -4.8, -2.3, 
and -0.9 percentage points for 30-34, 35-39 and 40-44 year old household 
heads, respectively. The point estimates still imply a negative effect for 45-49 
year old household heads, and a positive effect for the older households. Thus 
if the ratio of homeownership among young households climbed, then the 
saving rates among them reduced. Similarly, if the ratio of homeowners 
among old households dropped, the saving rates went down. 
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Table 2.14 Median Regressions for the Saving Rate 
  1993-1996 1997-2002 2003-2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Income 0.023 0.020 0.032 0.032 0.048 0.043 
  0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 
Non-regular Worker   -0.029   -0.034   -0.005 
    0.021   0.014   0.010 
Owns Home   0.014   0.007   0.019 
    0.007   0.004   0.005 
Age 30-34 0.002 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.010 0.005 
  0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.007 
Age 35-39 0.016 0.014 0.025 0.024 0.006 0.001 
  0.009 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.008 
Age 40-44 0.022 0.016 0.031 0.030 0.012 0.005 
  0.012 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.008 
Age 45-49 -0.009 -0.010 0.033 0.033 -0.001 -0.011 
  0.022 0.021 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.010 
Age 50-54 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.021 
  0.041 0.040 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.013 
Age 55-59 -0.048 -0.050 -0.025 -0.030 -0.004 -0.014 
  0.084 0.081 0.035 0.030 0.041 0.034 
Log Household Size 0.059 0.057 0.072 0.070 0.058 0.051 
  0.011 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 
Share aged 0-4 -0.128 -0.126 -0.120 -0.118 -0.073 -0.064 
  0.025 0.025 0.019 0.017 0.026 0.021 
Share aged 5-9 -0.203 -0.202 -0.169 -0.167 -0.110 -0.104 
  0.026 0.025 0.018 0.016 0.025 0.020 
Share aged 10-14 -0.222 -0.216 -0.190 -0.188 -0.126 -0.115 
  0.034 0.034 0.020 0.017 0.025 0.021 
Share aged 15-19 -0.178 -0.212 -0.255 -0.254 -0.172 -0.155 
  0.087 0.084 0.026 0.023 0.030 0.025 
Share aged Above 60 0.007 -0.016 -0.001 -0.010 0.055 0.052 
  0.031 0.030 0.021 0.019 0.028 0.023 
Observations 4128 4128 7151 7151 4226 4226 
 
Table 2.15 Median Regressions for the Saving Rate Including Imputed 
Value of Owner-Occupied Housing  
Dummy for Home Ownership 
  1998-2002 2003-2005 
  (1) (2) 
Log Income 0.084 0.081 
  0.007 0.008 
Owns Home -0.024 -0.012 
  0.005 0.006 
Observations 5865 4232 
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Table 2.15 (Continued) 
                Dummy for Home Ownership Interacted Age Dummies 
  1998-2002 2003-2005 
  (1) (2) 
Log Income 0.083 0.083 
  0.007 0.010 
Owns Home -0.024 0.008 
  0.011 0.010 
Owns Home*Age 30-34  -0.024 -0.031 
  0.015 0.018 
Owns Home*Age 35-39 0.001 -0.028 
  0.015 0.014 
Owns Home*Age 40-44 0.015 -0.013 
  0.014 0.011 
Owns Home*Age 45-49 -0.006 -0.010 
  0.023 0.018 
Owns Home*Age 50-54 -0.012 -0.050 
  0.063 0.042 
Owns Home*Age 55-59 0.331 -0.142 
  0.080 0.129 
Observations 5865 4232 
 
6. Conclusion 
The researched question is what causes the aggregate household 
saving in Japan to go down, and what kind of changes happened to people’s 
saving behavior. Under low income growth and prospects of sustained low 
income growth, the aggregated household saving rate in Japan dropped by 
about 10 percentage points over the period 1993-2005. It was found that the 
life-cycle model did not adequately explain the change in the aggregate 
household saving rate in Japan with respect to the change in the population 
structure. The ratio of aged population to production-age population is 
increasing rapidly and by the time series analysis, it showed that, in fact, the 
increase in the aged population ratio had a negative impact on the household 
saving rates. This partially explains the recent sharp decrease in the 
household saving rate in Japan’s aging society and is consistent with the life-
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cycle model. On the other hand, according to the life-cycle model, the increase 
in the ratio of child population leads to a decrease in the household saving 
rate. However, the result of the time series analysis shows that the impact of 
the increased child population ration was ambiguous.  
By using panel data, after controlling time and cohort effects, a hump-
shaped age-savings profile was found, with households headed by young 
persons and those headed by old persons having low saving rates and those 
headed by the middle aged having the highest saving rates.  
Taken at face value, the estimated age profile of savings suggests 
negative changes in the saving rate as Japan’s population ages since the old 
had among the low saving rates. Combining our estimated age-profile of 
savings for the 25-59 age group with the evolution of the Japanese population 
implies the further decrease in the aggregated saving rate.  
Habit formation considerations could in theory help explain the decline 
in saving rates after high economic growth, but evidence was not found 
supporting that channel. The savings driven by the motive of home ownership 
could partly account for the decrease in the household saving rate from 1993 
to 2005, when the decrease in having home among old households reduced 
the aggregated household saving rates. Within our composite regression 
framework, a comparison of saving behavior between households that own 
their dwellings and those that rent suggests the important role of this factor. 
The increasing burden of education expenditure seemed among the 
strongest candidates for explaining the change in saving rates. Our estimates 
show that the increase in the proportion of the family members under the age 
of 20, which had high positive correlation with the education expenditure, 
could largely explain the decrease in saving rates among households. In 
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addition, because more and more households did not live together with their 
aged parents, the household size itself was shrinking, which had a negative 
effect on saving rate.  
Finally, some weak indirect evidence in support of the target saving 
hypothesis was found, whereby Japanese households had lower saving rates 
because they were targeting a lower level of wealth and the real return on their 
savings, most of which went into bank deposits, had a small effect. 
Although there were limits to conduct the analysis using this dataset, it 
can be said that the changes in the population structure and the ones in the 
household saving behavior both were important factors in drastically 
decreasing the aggregated household saving rates in Japan. 
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APPENDIX 
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Figure 2.A.1 Saving Rate in the First Difference 
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Figure 2.A.2 Saving Rate in the Second Difference 
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Figure 2.A.3 Ratio of Child Population to Productive-Age Population in 
the First Difference 
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Figure 2.A.4 Ratio of Child Population to Productive-Age Population in 
the Second Difference 
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Figure 2.A.5 Ratio of Aged Population to Productive-Age Population in 
the First Difference 
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Figure 2.A.6 Ratio of Aged Population to Productive-Age Population in 
the Second Difference 
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Figure 2.A.7 Nominal and Real Policy Target Rate (1993 CPI index=100) 
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Figure 2.A.8 Demography in 1993  
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Figure 2.A.9 Demography in 1997 
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Figure 2.A.10 Demography in 2003                                                     
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Figure 2.A.11 Demography in 2005 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION IN JAPAN 
 
1. Introduction  
 The multi-person household is sometimes treated as a single unit. The 
adoption of the unitary model is convenient but it does not necessarily have a 
strong theoretical background. In addition, previous empirical studies indicate 
that this unitary model does not hold in many cases. This paper analyzes 
whether the collective model suggested in Chiappori explains the household 
allocation pattern in Japan. This model makes two assumptions. One is that 
each person in the household has his or her own preferences and the other is 
that collective decisions are Pareto efficient. Under these assumptions, the 
model by Browning and Chiappori (1998) is reviewed and then the conditions 
on a sample of Japanese households are tested. 
 The first model to describe household behavior as a collective process 
was developed by Becker in his seminal work (1991). Bourguignon (1984) and 
Pollak (1995) emphasized that a multi-person approach might lead to 
violations of the predictions from the unitary model. Since then, several 
models have been established to explain intra-household decision making as 
a cooperative process. One of them is the Nash bargaining representation of 
family decisions by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). 
This approach has two main concepts. One is that household demands should 
be sensitive to the intra-household distribution of resources. The other is that 
the repeated rejections of Slutsky symmetry in empirical work may happen 
because household decisions cannot be crammed into a restrictive unitary 
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framework. Browning and Chiappori’s model developed this Nash-bargaining 
framework.  
 A household is a good example of a repeated game so it is justified to 
assume that each person knows the preference of the other members in the 
family. Thus, cooperation for utilizing earnings often can be a long-term 
equilibrium of repeated noncooperative frameworks. In addition, efficiency is 
probably the most natural generalization to the multi-person setting of utility 
maximization in standard models. Hence, the conditions Browning and 
Chiappori drove generalize Slutsky symmetry. Finally, axiomatic models of 
bargaining with symmetric information assume efficient outcomes.  
 
2. Theory 
2.1 General Case 
2.1.1 The collective Setting  
 According to Browning and Chiappori, although Slutsky symmetry does 
not need to hold in the collective setting, it can be generalized that the Slutsky 
matrix has to be equal to the sum of a symmetric matrix and a rank one matrix. 
They also showed that the collective model implies that there is a close 
relationship between the influence of variables that do not enter individual 
utilities directly but that affect distribution within the household, on demand 
and price responses. The preference behaved in the following way; 
  
Axiom 1: Member I’s (I = A, B) preferences can be represented by a utility 
function in the form ),,( Qqqu BAI
  that is strongly concave and twice 
differentiable in ),,( Qqq BA
 , and strictly increasing in ),( Qq I
 . 
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where Aq  and Bq  are private consumption by A and B, and Q

 is public 
consumption. Then, efficiency is postulated as follows; 
 
Axiom 2: The outcome of the household decision process is a Pareto efficient, 
meaning for any price-income bundle ),( xp , the consumption vector 
),,( Qqq BA
  chosen by the household is such that no other vector ),,( Qqq BA
  in 
the budget set could make both members better off.   
 
Following Chiappori (1992), the models that allow for different 
preferences with efficiency are referred to as the collective setting. Finally, 
some structure is added by assuming the following axiom; 
 
Axiom 3: There exists a differentiable, zero-homogeneous function ),( xpµ  
such that, for any ),( xp , the vectors ),,( Qqq BA
  are solutions to the program; 
 
),,()],(1[),,(),(max
,,
QqquxpQqquxp BABBAA
Qqq BA

⋅−+⋅ µµ                           (1) 
      subject to xQqqp BA =++⋅ )(
 . 
 
where p  is a price vector and x is total expenditure. Any point on the Pareto 
frontier can be obtained by solving this program. This axiom premises that 
there exists a demand function. Here, (i) the assumption is consistent with our 
general framework, which postulates efficiency. In addition, (ii) assuming the 
existence of a demand function is not extremely restrictive. Most work on 
demand uses a similar assumption.  
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Two additional points should be noted at this moment. One is µ  may 
also depend on other factors, such as the individual incomes of the two 
partners. The other is the assumption that preferences are identical is made.  
 The function ),( xpq   meets the following propositions; 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that ),( xpq   is compatible with collective rationality, 
meaning that there exist functions ),(),,(),,( xpQxpqxpq BA  , solution of a 
program (1), such that ),(),(),(),( xpQxpqxpqxpq BA  ++= . Then it is zero-
homogeneous, continuously differentiable, and satisfies xxpqp =),('  . 
  
Next, the household utility function is defined as follows.  
 
Definition 1: In the collecting setting, the household utility function is defined as  
 
),,()],(1[),,(),(max),(
,,
QqquxpQqquxpqu BABBAA
Qqq
H
BA

⋅−+⋅= µµµ  
      subject to qQqq BA 

=++ . 
 
2.1.2 Dual Representatives of the Collective Program 
Given the utility function for the two people, a dual representation of 
household preferences can be defined. First, define the household indirect 
function as the initial optimization problem above is as follows; 
 
),,(]1[),,(max),,(
,,
QqquQqquxpV BABBAA
Qqq BA

⋅−+⋅= µµµ                         (2)               
      subject to xQqqp BA =++⋅ )(
 . 
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The corresponding expenditure function is defined as; 
 
      xQqqpupE BA
Qqq BA
=++⋅= )(min),,(
,,

µ .                                                    (3) 
 subject to uQqquQqqu BABBAA ≥⋅−+⋅ ),,(]1[),,(

µµ . 
 
By the duality between (2) and (3), the following equation is obtained,  
 
 jijiji phxffpf ∂∂=∂⋅∂+∂∂ ///  
 
where ),,( µxpfq =  is the solution of the program (2) and ),,( µuph   is the 
solution of (3). The matrix Σ  with general form 
 
 xqfpf jijiij ∂⋅∂+∂∂= //σ  
 
can be interpreted as the partial derivatives of demands with respect to prices, 
holding both household utility and µ  constant. 
 
2.1.3 Restrictions on Demands 
Now restrictions on various demands for consumption goods are 
investigated. For any given price-income bundle ),( xp , the behavior that is 
observable corresponds to one specific value of µ . What is observable is the 
demand function ξ  defined by 
 
 )),(,,(),( xpxpfxp  µξ = . 
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In the collective model, the following characteristics are established; 
 
Proposition 2: The Pseudo-Slutsky matrix S is the sum of a symmetric and 
negative semi-definite matrix Σ and outer product: 
 
 'uvS +Σ=  
 
where u  and v  are n-vectors with 
 
 µ∂∂= /ii fu   and jij xpv ξµµ ⋅∂∂+∂∂= // . 
 
This formula means that assuming that the price of good j is changed by jdp , 
the change is compensated by an increase in income jj dpqdx ⋅= . This 
explains that the change in price can be decomposed into a substitution effect 
and a wealth effect. 
  The following corollary mentions a useful consequence; 
 
Corollary 1 (SR1 Property): In the collective setting, the pseudo-Slutsky matrix 
S is the sum of a symmetric, negative semi-definitive matrix Σ  and a matrix R 
that has at most rank one. 
 
This condition generalizes the unitary model where R=0. 
 
2.1.4 Testing for SR1 
 Following the above, the proposition underlining the empirical analysis 
is as follows; 
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Proposition 3: Let S denote the pseudo-Slutsky matrix, and let M=S-S’. Then, 
in the collective setting: 
(i) M has rank zero and two. 
(ii) If M has rank zero, the unitary case cannot be ruled out. 
(iii) If M has rank 2, then '' vuuvM −=  for two vectors u  and v  that span Im(M), 
which represents the subspace spanned by the columns of M. Moreover, for 
any vector w  orthogonal to lm(M), then 0' ≤Sww . 
 
Also, given the homogeneity assumption, one needs at least five commodities 
to test the SR1 property. 
 
2.2 Extension of the Theory  
 Now the theory is extended to three models. The first extension allows 
for households to have more than two members. The second allows variables 
that affect the distribution function µ  but not preferences directly. The third 
extension puts some restrictions on the way prices enter µ . 
 
2.2.1 Multiple-member model 
 If there are more than two people in the family, then the class of 
demands admitted in the collective setting is generally wider. The conditions 
are given as follows; 
 
Proposition 5: Assume that the family has k+1 members where k<(n-1). In the 
collective setting the Pseudo-Slutsky matrix S is the sum of a symmetric matrix 
and a matrix of rank no lager than k (SRk). 
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One possible application is to households with children. In the multi-
person model, if there are as many people as goods minus one, then the 
collective setting does not impose any restrictions on demand as follows; 
 
Proposition6: Suppose that the household has at least (n-1) members. For any 
finite set of prices and demands, preferences for which observed behavior is 
compatible with the collective setting can be found. 
 
2.2.2 Allowing Distribution Factors 
 The next extension to the basic model is the inclusion of factors that 
affect the distribution function ),( xpµ . First, the case with a single distribution 
factor y is included so that ),,( yxpµµ = . This means that y only joins the 
household utility function through the same index as prices and total 
expenditure: )).,,(,( yxpquu  µ=  Household demands take the form 
)),,(,,(),,( yxpxpfyxp  µξ = . Denoting the gradient of demands to changes in 
y by yξ , this factor can affect demands in the following manner; 
 
Proposition 7: In the collective setting, there are following equivalent 
conditions: 
(i) The Pseudo-Slutsky matrix takes the form 'vS yξ+Γ=  where Γ  is 
symmetric. 
(ii) yξ  can be expressed as a linear combination of the columns (S-S’). 
 
Since S and the vector yξ  are observable, condition (ii) can be used to 
test for this restriction. If more distribution factors are added so that y is a 
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vector, then the collective setting imposes further restrictions. Bourguignon 
(1993) proved that: 
 
Proposition 8: In the collective setting, there are: 
 
  
ii yiy
ξθξ = , for all 2≥i , where Ri ∈θ .  
 
2.2.3 Restricting the Dependence of Distribution on Prices 
 Third, an alternative structure can be imposed on the distribution 
function µ . Suppose that prices are restricted to enter µ  only through a 
known linear homogenous price index )( pπ . In addition, prices and income 
can be normalized in the same way. Let iP , X, Y denote real variables; 
 
 )(/ ppP ii

π=  , )(/ pxX π= , )(/ pyY π= . 
 
Then, demands can be expressed as functions of real variables: 
 
 ),,())(/),(/),(/(),,( YXPpypxppyxp iii ξπππξξ ==
 . 
 
Consequently, the following proposition can be obtained. 
 
Proposition 9: It there is only a single distribution factor and ),( YXµµ = , then 
the Pseudo-Slutsky matrix takes the form: 'ξξ ykS +Γ=  where k is a constant. 
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Because the two components of the outer product on the right hand 
side can be observed, this gives a test of the collective model with a known 
linear homogeneous price index and a single distribution factor.  
  
3. A Parametric Demand System 
 In this section, a parameterization for the demand system is considered 
and the implications of the restrictions implied by the collecting setting are 
derived.  
 
3.1 Quadratic Log Demand System 
The Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) of Banks, 
Blundell, and Lewbel (1992) is the starting point. The budget share n-vector ω 
is modeled as a function of log prices and log total expenditure. p is the n-
vector of log prices and x is total expenditure. The QUAIDS demand system is; 
 
   )(/))((ln))((ln 2 pbpaxpaxp 

−+−+Γ+= λβαω                                    (4) 
 
where α , β

, and λ

 are n-vectors of parameters and Γ is an n×n matrix of 
parameters. The prices )( pa   and )( pb   are defined as  
 
 ppppa  Γ++= '5.0')( 0 αα    
 )'exp()( ppb 

β= . 
 
Homogeneity is imposed in the following cases and n is the number of goods 
minus one. ),,( λβα
  and Γ are reduced vectors and matrices.  
 The Pseudo-Slutsky matrix for the parameterization is derived; 
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 'ωωω  xpS +=   
 
where pω
  is the n × n Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the budget 
shares with respect to log prices and xω
  is the gradient of ω  with respect to 
lnx. Applying this to the previous equations gives 
 
)))(/~(')(/~)''('(~)'('))(/~2(5.0 2pbxpbxxppbxS 

λλλββλββλβ ++++Γ−Γ+−Γ=  
where )(ln~ paxx −= .  
 
3.2 Testing for Implications of the Collective Model 
 The necessary and sufficient condition for symmetry and symmetry plus 
one (SR1) for our parameterization is; 
 
Proposition 10: S is SR1 for all ),( xp  iff Γ is SR1. 
 
Including the preference factors by allowing them to modify the parameters of 
the indices )( pa   and )( pb  ; 
 
 pppzzpa  Γ++= '5.0)'(),( 0 αα  
 and 
 ))'(exp(),( pzzpb  β=         
 
In our parameterization, a(z) and b(z) are taken to be linear; 
 
 
α
ααααα l
l zzz +++=  1
10)(   
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where αl  is the number of preference factors included in the α( ) term and the 
kα ‘s are n-vectors. Similarly, 
 
 
β
βββββ l
l zzz +++=  1
10)(  
 
 To incorporate the distribution factors, it is convenient to include the 
distribution factors in the constant tern in (4); 
  
),(/)),((ln)),()(ln()( 2 zpbzpaxzpaxzpyz 

−+−+Γ+Θ+= λβαω          (5) 
 
where y is an m-vector of distribution factors and Θ is an n×m matrix of 
parameters.   
 The next condition is the distribution factor proportionality condition 
given in Proposition 8. This is tested by testing for the following condition on 
the columns of Θ ; 
 
 1Θ=Θ k
k τ  for 2≥k . 
 
If this condition and SR1 are not rejected, then the distribution factor linearity 
can be tested. Denoting the ith column of M as iM , the joint test for 
distribution factor proportionality and linearity is formulated; 
 
 )'(*)( 21
21 τλτλMM=Θ  
 
This restriction have m(n-2)-1 degrees of freedom.  
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 Now the tests are presented for symmetry, symmetry plus rank one, 
distribution factor proportionality, and distribution factor linearity and 
proportionality. In the next section, these conditions are examined using the 
household panel data. 
 
4. Empirical Analyses 
4.1 Data 
To test and estimate the collective model, several features are required 
in the data. First, information on household demands is needed; thus 
household data has to be used. Also enough price variation is necessary for 
allowing us to estimate the price responses reliably. This already rules out 
many data sets since this requires either a long time series of cross sections 
or a shorter time series with some observable cross-section price dispersion 
within the period. Finally reliable information on the individual incomes of the 
members of the household is necessary since these incomes will be our prime 
candidates for distribution factors. 
As with the previous papers, the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers 
(JPSC) is also used. JPSC is a multi-staged stratified clustered survey that 
collects information on monthly expenditures, incomes, labor supply, and 
demographics for individual households. The samples are composed of three 
different cohorts. Cohort A consists of a group of young women aged between 
24 and 34 who were randomly selected from across Japan in 1993 for an in-
home questionnaire survey. Cohort B, consisting of women aged between 24 
and 27 in 1997, and cohort C, consisting of women aged between 24 and 29 
in 2003, were added respectively in 1997 and 2003. The relatively high 
response rate of this annual survey has overcome the inherent disadvantages 
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of a panel survey. JPSC contains household data and information on 
household demands for consumption goods. The consumption data includes 
enough number of durable goods and it enables us to estimate the price 
responses. In addition, the incomes of each member of the sample families 
were reported and this data could be distribution factors.  Therefore, JPSC 
meets the necessary conditions to test and estimate the collective model. 
Although the survey started in 1993, the data did not have consumption data 
by item at the early stage. This information started to be available in 1998, so 
the observations only after 1998 were used here.  
Prices were taken from the retail price survey conducted by the Japan 
statistics bureau. The survey covers most major consumption goods and 
gathers data from towns of different sizes all over Japan every year. The 
bureau sometimes change the items included in the survey following any 
changes in the life styles among the people. In our analyses, the prices of 
goods which represent each category and are consistently recorded were 
chosen.  
 
4.2 Sample Selection  
Table 3.1 gives the sample selection path followed; the principal 
selection is on all agents being in full-time employment and under the age of 
65. In addition, we selected on the education level being observed, net 
household income being positive, and, for couples, gross earnings being 
above JPY 100,000 (in 1998 terms) (see "reasonable earnings" in the Table). 
Experiments were also made with cleaner samples than those reported. For 
example, households with very low net incomes or high budget shares for 
individual goods were excluded. In no case were the qualitative results 
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different. For single-person households, most samples were kept, but for two-
person households, many samples dropped through the selection process. 
This means that females earned a certain amount of income by themselves 
when they were single and lived alone. However, once they got married, many 
wives did not work or earned little. Thus, only 519 samples were selected 
among 898 married samples.  
Table 3.2 presents sample means and other statistics for all of the 
variables used in the analysis except for the homogeneous prices. The mean 
of monthly earnings of two-person households was larger than the one of 
single-person households, but wives of two-person households had lower 
incomes than single females. On the other hand, husbands earned more than 
single women. The standard deviations of the household expenditure and net 
income for couples were larger than those for singles. This indicates that there 
were more variety in life styles among married couples than among singles in 
terms of income and expenditure.  
Regarding comparison of expenditure share by items (Table 3.3), both 
single-person and two-person households spent a large portion of their 
incomes on food. In this survey, food includes both eating at home and eating 
outside, and the service fees at the restaurants were also included. Single-
person households spent more money on clothing than two-person 
households. This may suggest that the preferences between the two kinds of 
households were different. On the other hand, two-person households used 
slightly more money on transportation than single-person households. Neither 
of them purchased very much clothing, and a few households ever bought no 
clothing. There did not seem to be much difference in consumption on 
communication between single-person and two-person households. 
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4.3 Single-person Households   
Figure 3.1 shows the average income of selected single-person 
households by age in 1998, 2001, and 2005. This figure indicates that the 
average income did not change so much as the people got older. This can be 
attributed to the jobs which female workers were involved in. Traditionally, 
more than 50 percent of female labor are non-regular workers and the wage of 
non-regular workers increase little even for older workers (Steinberg and 
Nakane, 2010). Figure 3.2 represents consumption of single-person 
households by age. Food occupied a large portion of their expenditure on 
nondurable goods for every one and consumption of clothing was large for 
some cohorts. Utility and communication costs seemed stable across ages 
and years.   
 
4.4 Two-person Households  
As for two-person households, the husbands earned more than wives 
even though both had their own jobs. The difference in the amount of earnings 
became larger as they got older. In this case, it was also observed that the 
wages of female workers did not necessarily increase while male workers 
earned more as they got older. Regarding the consumption by goods, food 
occupied a large part of total expenditure for every household across years. 
Communication and utility costs were stable like single-person households. 
The expenditure on clothing declined as the samples became older. This 
might be caused by the changes in the preference. For two-person 
households, the samples were asked how much money they spent for each 
household member in one month. According to their answers, the portion of 
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the consumption for husbands was much larger than the one for wives. 
Compared with Figure 3.3, the share of consumption spent for wives was 
unnaturally small. This might be brought about by the fact that the respondees 
were women. According to Vardharajan (2005), the responses about private 
consumptions could be different between husbands and wives. In this case, 
wives might underestimate the benefit which they obtained for themselves. In 
the analysis of the demand function, the data of expenditure by item was used 
and that kind of bias was more likely to be avoided.    
The survey also collects information on how the households manage 
their income. They set up sixteen different types of income management, 
which can be divided into three groups. In A and B, only husbands have 
monthly earnings. If husbands give only a part of their wages to their wives, 
the households belong to A. Meanwhile, if husbands give their whole salaries 
to their wives, then the households belong to B. Our samples for the analysis 
on the collective model were only composed of households where both 
members have full-time jobs, so the type A and B households were not 
included although they are one of the major types in Japan. From C to L, both 
husbands and wives have monthly earnings. In C, husbands and wives pool 
their whole wages and the wives manage their incomes. In D, wives manage 
the whole incomes of their husbands and a part of their own earnings as a 
common financial resource, but, at the same time, wives keep a part of their 
own wages for their personal use. In E, wives manage the incomes of their 
husbands as a common resource, and keep all of their own earnings for their 
personal use. In F, husbands keep a part of his earnings for their personal use, 
and wives control the rest of their combined incomes. In G both husbands and 
wives keep a part of their own wages and wives manage the rest of their 
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incomes. In H, wives do not pool their own wages and manage a part of the 
wages of their husbands. Husbands also secure a part of their earnings for 
their personal use. In type I, husbands and wives manage their own salaries 
individually. In J, K, and L, husbands control their pooled salaries, and, at the 
same time, they have a part of their wages for their private expenditure. In J 
wives let husbands control a part of their wages. In K wives give all of their 
salary to their husbands, and receive an allowance. Type L is similar to K, but 
wives do not have money for their personal use.  
Those 16 types can be categorized into three different groups. One is a 
group of households managed by wives such as A-H. Another is a group of 
households managed by husbands such as J, K, and L, and the other is a 
group of households where the husbands and wives manage their incomes 
individually, such as I. The income management type should have an 
influence on how households spend their income, and the dummy variable 
which distinguishes the management type was included in the collective model 
in section 5.  
According to Table 3.4, in most households, wives took the initiative to 
manage their incomes. However, there seemed to be some changes occurring 
year to year. In 1998, 83.0% of households belonged to the wife-management 
type, but in 2003, the ratio had dropped to 73.2%. On the other hand, 
households categorized into the other two types had increased. In 1998, 
husband-management households and individual management were 6.8% 
and 5.1% respectively. In 2003, the ratios rose to 10.5% and 14.0%. Because 
most households stayed in the same category (Table 3.A.6), this change was 
caused by joining of new samples. This means that there is a difference in the 
type of income management at home among cohorts (Table 3.6).      
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 The relationship between income and management type was analyzed. 
Table 3.7 and 3.8 show that the management type was not strongly correlated 
with income level.  In addition, the relationship between the management type 
and other variables except consumption such as education level of household 
head or home ownership were checked and it was found that the management 
type did not have any strong correlation with other variables. The relationship 
between the consumption and the management type is analyzed in the 
following section.     
 Last but not least, the demographic variables of single-person and two-
person households were analyzed. There existed significant difference in car-
ownership and house-ownership between the two kinds of households. On the 
other hand, there was no significant difference in residence, education level, 
white collar dummy, education level and age.     
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Table 3.1 Sample Selection 
  Single Women Couples 
Full Sample 725 898 
Employment 725 876 
Age<65 725 876 
Income positive 725 525 
Education level given 725 525 
Reasonable expenditure 723 521 
Reasonable earnings 723 519 
 
Table 3.2 Description of Monthly Total Expenditure and Earnings 
  Single Couples 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Total Expenditure 165.668 68.239 234.418 102.604 
Household Net Income 212.996 88.219 370.382 148.458 
Husbands' Earnings - - 261.044 93.972 
Wife's Earnings - - 141.443 79.982 
 
Table 3.3 Description of Budget Shares 
Budget Shares Single Couples 
Mean # of Zeros Mean # of Zeros 
Food 0.445 7 0.468 4 
Utilities 0.150 38 0.162 2 
Men's Clothing 0.000 723 0.014 245 
Women's Clothing 0.139 263 0.011 264 
Transportation 0.132 118 0.171 44 
Communication 0.134 66 0.118 39 
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Figure 3.1 Monthly Income of Single-person Households 
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Figure 3.2 Monthly Consumption of Single-person Households by Item 
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Figure 3.3 Monthly Income of Two-person Households 
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Figure 3.4 Monthly Consumption of Two-person Households by Item 
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Figure 3.5 Monthly Consumption of Two-person Households by person 
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Figure 3.6 Income Management Type 
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Table 3.4 Distribution of Income Management Type 
Type 
1998 
(%) 
2001 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C 38.98 48.15 30.23 
D 1.69 7.41 2.33 
E 18.64 11.11 12.79 
F 11.86 11.11 3.49 
G 5.08 5.56 9.3 
H 6.78 3.7 15.12 
I  5.08 7.41 13.95 
J 5.08 3.7 5.81 
K 0.00 0.00 4.65 
L 1.69 0.00 0.00 
Others 5.08 1.85 2.33 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of Income Management Type by Year 
Type 1998 (%) 
2001 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
Wife Management (A-H) 83.03 87.04 73.26 
Husband Management (J-L) 6.77 3.70 10.46 
Individual Management (I) 5.08 7.41 13.95 
 
Table 3.6 Distribution of Income Management Type by Cohort 
Type Cohort A (%) 
Cohort B 
(%) 
Cohort C 
(%) 
Wife Management (A-H) 85.52 83.15 70.94 
Husband Management (J-L) 4.98 11.80 13.68 
Individual Management (I) 8.60 3.37 15.38 
 
Table 3.7 Monthly Income of Two-person Households by Management 
Type and Year 
 1998 
Type Median S.D. Min Max 
Wife Management (A-H) 314.6 112.9 87.1 687.3 
Husband Management (J-L) 300.1 97.6 232.3 435.6 
Individual Management (I) 319.5 148.4 300.1 566.3 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
2001 
Type Median S.D. Min Max 
Wife Management (A-H) 346.8 138.0 192.1 809.9 
Husband Management (J-L) 255.2 96.1 187.2 323.2 
Individual Management (I) 396.6 168.7 78.8 443.3 
 
2005 
Type Median S.D. Min Max 
Wife Management (A-H) 350.0 129.1 120.0 763.0 
Husband Management (J-L) 380.0 250.0 145.0 911.0 
Individual Management (I) 319.5 206.0 130.0 920.0 
 
Table 3.8 Monthly Income of Two-person Households by Management 
Type and Cohort 
Cohort A 
Management Type Mean S.D. Min Max 
Wife Management (A-H) 385.9 156.9 87.1 1093.7 
Husband Management (J-L) 577.4 352.1 169.0 1165.0 
Individual Management (I) 423.1 181.6 78.8 964.2 
 
Cohort B 
Management Type Mean S.D. Min Max 
Wife Management (A-H) 359.6 111.8 156.6 757.0 
Husband Management (J-L) 344.9 130.0 185.9 730.0 
Individual Management (I) 324.2 79.2 270.0 478.6 
 
Cohort C 
Management Type Mean S.D. Min Max 
Wife Management (A-H) 337.2 127.0 119.6 763.0 
Husband Management (J-L) 316.3 74.1 145.0 427.0 
Individual Management (I) 374.0 184.2 130.0 920.0 
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Table 3.9 Means of Demographic Variables 
Variables Single Women Couples 
City dweller 0.451 0.412 
Car owner 0.394 0.890 
Homeowner 0.107 0.331 
Higher Education 0.494 0.447 
White collar 0.668 0.611 
Age  31.018 34.233 
Age of Wife - 32.039 
Wife Management - 0.809 
 
 
5. Analyses and Interpretation  
5.1 Econometric Condition 
Unobservable heterogeneity should be allowed in each partner’s 
preferences and the distribution function. In addition, the possible endogeneity 
of total expenditure is allowed. In a previous sector, it is mentioned that 
equation (5) is nonlinear. First the parameters and covariance matrix of the 
parameters of the system (5) with no restrictions are estimated by using MLE 
methods. These are denoted by φ and C respectively. Then the restrictions 
are imposed by solving  
 
 ))(())'((min 1 ηϕηϕ
η
fCf −− −                                                                    (6) 
 
where )(ηf  is the mapping from the restricted parameters η to the 
unrestricted parameter φ. The value of this minimand gives the 2χ  statistic for 
the restriction. The covariance matrix for the restricted parameter estimates 
are given by 1)'( −CFF  where F  is the Jacobian of )(⋅f evaluated at ηˆ , the 
vector that minimizes (6). 
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5.2 Unitary Model 
First it was assumed that the unitary model holds for all households. 
The parameters of the system given in (5) without the Θmatrix were estimated. 
Prices included food prices, which were numeraire, utility prices, clothing 
prices, transportation fees, and communication prices. For the single-person 
households, there were seven preference variables in the )(⋅a  index. These 
were dummies for car ownership, house ownership, living in a city, the female 
having more than high school education, the female having a white collar job, 
age and age squared. Also, two variables were included in )(⋅b  index; car 
ownership and house ownership. The absolute price of the numeraire good 
was excluded from the demand system since homogeneity was maintained 
and it was also correlated with total expenditure since agents were not at all 
sensitive to real interest rates. As to the income variables, in a unitary model 
income should not affect demand once we condition on total expenditure but it 
was obviously correlated with total expenditure. One objection to this is that 
preferences may be correlated with demand if, for example, higher paid jobs 
require more expensive clothing. In this case we would expect to see that 
higher paid individuals had a higher budget share for clothing than lower paid 
individuals with the same total expenditure. This was entirely plausible, but it 
was rejected in our case. 
For couples, in addition to the five goods prices, the prices of men’s 
clothing were introduced. Eight preference factors were included in the )(⋅a  
index. Six dummy variables and three continuous variables were also added. 
The selection of these variables was based on the end result of some 
preliminary analysis which excluded some other variables (such as the wife's 
education) which were found to be wholly insignificant. The dummies were 
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home ownership, living in a city, car ownership, the husband having more than 
a high school education, the husband having a white collar job, and the wife-
management dummy. The wife-management dummy variable took the value 
one if the income management types were categorized into A-H. Otherwise, 
the variable took zero. The three continuous variables were the age and age 
squared of the husband and the age of wife. For the preference factors in the 
b( ) index, the same variables were included as for singles, that is, dummy 
variables for car and home ownership.  
Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 show the estimated parameters of single-
person households and two-person households respectively. Among single-
person households, city-dweller spent more on transportation and 
communication. In general, in cities, people commute by public transportation 
every day and have more chances to use communication devices, so the 
signs of the parameters make sense. Home owners spent less on 
transportation and communication. This might be because their houses were 
built near their offices and the commute fees could be reduced. Although the 
reason for lower expenditure on communication is hard to define, it might be 
that home owners took advantage of obtaining special discount when making 
contract with communication companies such as a combined telephone, TV, 
internet package. The expenditure on transportation and communication of 
higher educated people and white collars was also lower. Maybe they could 
afford to have or rent houses near their offices to save on transportation and 
communication fees. In the case of two-person households, city-dwellers 
spent more on utilities, whose charges are higher in the city areas. Household 
owners also spent more money for utilities. In general, privately owned houses 
are larger than rented houses, so they need more utilities. What is interesting 
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is that higher educated people or white collars spent more money on their 
clothing. This might represent that higher educated people or white collars 
were required to wear a variety of clothes or higher quality clothing. Wife-
management dummy represents that the households where wives managed 
their incomes saved more on the expenditure on utilities. On the other hand, 
those households purchased more clothes for both men and women. 
According to this model, wives might know more about how to reduce the 
utility cost. Instead, they tended to spend more on their personal items.         
In Table 3.13, the tests for symmetry for our two strata are presented. It 
seems that the singles data were consistent with the unitary model (or at least 
the implications of symmetry and the exclusion of income). The results for 
couples are representative of the results usually presented in the literature on 
demand analysis on micro data: the symmetry restrictions were rejected at 
conventional sizes. One reaction to this is to adjust significance levels so that 
these test statistics are not interpreted as indicating rejection. For example, if a 
Schwarz critical level of (degrees of freedom * log (sample size)) for both of 
the tests given here are used, then it would be concluded that the unitary 
model was, a posteriori, the more likely. Under this interpretation there are no 
problems with the application of the unitary model to household data. The 
converse view is that the restrictions are suspect and that we cannot 
necessarily apply the unitary model to two-person households. Now testing the 
implications of our proposed alternative for couples, the collective model is 
investigated.  
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5.3 The Collective Model  
The results presented in Table 3.13 suggest that there were some 
problems with imposing the unitary model on the couple data that did not 
appear for single-person households. Thus, the collective model for couples 
was estimated. To do this, two extra variables on the right-hand side of the 
demand equations were included: First, the log of the wife's earnings minus 
the log of the husband's income, which is called the income difference; 
Second, the wife's gross income. The parameter estimates for the unrestricted 
demand system are presented in Table 3.12; the tests of particular interest are 
presented in Table 3.14. In the collective model, higher educated households 
and white collar workers tended to spend more on their clothing. The main 
difference in estimated parameters between the collective model and the 
unitary model was the wife-management dummy. This time, the expense of 
wife-management households was higher, but the consumption on 
transportation and communication occupied a smaller portion.  This can be 
that according to this model, the households whose income was managed by 
wives spent more on home operations. 
The first two rows in Table 3.14 test for symmetry and symmetry plus 
rank one. Comparing the test statistics for symmetry in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 it 
can be seen that adding the individual income variables decreases the test 
statistic slightly but not to the point where symmetry at conventional levels of 
significance would not be rejected. The SR1 condition, however, was not 
rejected. Thus the price responses were consistent with the collective model. 
The next row presents the test for distribution factor proportionality. As already 
discussed this restriction is independent of the test for SR1. The 
proportionality test was also not rejected. Finally, a test for SR1, distribution 
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factor proportionality, and distribution factor linearity was conducted together; 
see the final row of Table 3.14. As can be seen, these restrictions were not 
rejected. It can be concluded that the data were consistent with the collective 
setting   
Although the foregoing analysis indicates that it is necessary to weaken 
the unitary model for two-person households, it is not so clear that this has any 
strong implications on the values that we are usually concerned with in 
demand models. In this investigation, one further restriction on our estimates 
of the collective model was imposed. This restriction was that it is only the 
difference in log earnings that enters the sharing function. This is a very 
natural assumption to test for in this context. The )5(2χ  value with the 
proportionality factor in the collective-restricted model (the last row of Table 
3.14) as zero was 240.65; thus the hypothesis that the wife's income has a 
role to play over and above its effect on the differences in log incomes can be 
rejected. In all that follows the unrestricted unitary model was compared with 
the unrestricted collective model with two proportional factors (Table 3.14) and 
the restricted collective model with only the difference in log income (Table 
3.15). Referring to Table 3.15, it seems that an increase in the wife's share of 
income (holding everything else constant) increased the demand for men’s 
and women's clothing and decreased the demand for utilities.    
 In order to analyze the robustness of the collective model of two-person 
household and the possible patterns of the consumption behavior of three-
person households which consist of husband, wife and one child, the same 
regression model and tests for as the two-person households were conducted 
using three-person household data. First, it was confirmed whether the unitary 
model can be applied to three-person households. Then, it was examined 
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whether the collective model of two-person households can explain how 
members allocate their incomes in three-person households. Those results 
were shown in Table 3.16-3.20.  
      Table 3.18 shows that it might not be appropriate that the unitary model 
is applied to three-person households since the symmetry was rejected. Then, 
the test of SR1, distribution factor proportionality, and SR1, distribution factor 
proportionality and linearity was conducted. According to Table 3.19, it cannot 
be rejected that the collective model of two-person households represents the 
intra-household income allocation of three-person households. This can be 
interpreted in a couple of different ways. First, the consumption behavior of 
three-person households can be explained by two utility functions. Maybe 
husbands and wives decide how to spend their incomes, or the utility function 
of their children is the same as either husbands’ or wives’. Second, the 
variables should be changed from two-person households to three-person 
households. In this dataset, the available variables were limited but maybe 
different variables could be inserted into the model to check whether the 
collective model can be adopted to three-person households. Third, the 
collective model of two-person households is not robust enough. Although the 
hypothesis that the empirical data does not support the collective model of 
two-person cannot be rejected, that model might not grasp the intra-household 
income allocation of two-person household accurately. This is why the 
collective model did not distinguish between two-person households and three 
person households. 
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Table 3.10 Parameter Estimates for Unitary Model of Single Households 
  Utility Women's clothing Transportation Communication 
Intercept -0.975 0.376 1.814 0.152 
  [0.426] [0.717] [0.968] [0.854] 
City -0.00985 0.0308 0.131 0.0710 
  [0.0161] [0.0299] [0.0434] [0.0308] 
Car 
Ownership -0.0320 0.0835 0.0334 0.0370 
  [0.0323] [0.0739] [0.0564] [0.0558] 
Home 
Ownership 0.654 0.186 -1.214 -1.218 
  [0.330] [0.450] [0.729] [0.658] 
Higher 
Education -0.00275 0.0140 -0.0761 -0.0422 
  [0.00874] [0.0156] [0.0242] [0.0168] 
White Collar -0.00796 0.0132 -0.0605 -0.0249 
  [0.00754] [0.0144] [0.0224] [0.0147] 
Age -0.000607 0.0148 0.0421 0.0164 
  [0.00595] [0.0133] [0.0215] [0.0126] 
Squared 
Age 4.69e-06 -0.000243 -0.000707 -0.000271 
  [9.33e-05] [0.000204] [0.000326] [0.000194] 
Price (U) 0.263 -0.694 -0.183 0.241 
  [0.266] [0.357] [0.577] [0.390] 
Price (W) -0.0216 0.0827 0.0105 0.0168 
  [0.0229] [0.0526] [0.0413] [0.0407] 
Price (T) 0.398 0.161 -1.218 -0.882 
  [0.202] [0.314] [0.461] [0.389] 
Price (C) 0.235 -0.240 -0.782 -0.102 
  [0.216] [0.157] [0.343] [0.283] 
Beta 
Intercept -0.323 0.491 0.864 0.344 
  [0.297] [0.292] [0.448] [0.481] 
Beta Car 
Owner -0.292 0.497 3.542 1.380 
  [0.565] [0.526] [0.704] [0.951] 
Beta Home 
Owner -0.00585 -0.207 1.051 0.684 
  [0.335] [0.236] [0.553] [0.438] 
Lambda 1.002 -1.299 -4.236 -0.840 
  [0.468] [0.399] [0] [0.736] 
Observation 723 
 
 
 
 174 
 
Table 3.11 Parameter Estimates for Unitary Model of Two-person 
Households 
  Utility Men Clothes 
Women 
Clothes Transportation Communication 
Intercept -0.0320 0.0291 -0.0253 -0.0989 0.515 
  [0.939] [0.448] [0.415] [1.007] [0.885] 
City 0.169 -0.112 -0.103 -0.0880 -0.00636 
  [0.0667] [0.0495] [0.0417] [0.0675] [0.0817] 
Car  0.569 -0.377 -0.337 -0.0153 -0.122 
Ownership [0.175] [0.109] [0.0916] [0.190] [0.208] 
Home  1.169 0.372 0.0987 -0.830 -0.947 
Ownership [0.460] [0.213] [0.151] [0.341] [0.447] 
Higher  -0.128 0.0853 0.0748 0.0400 0.00943 
Education [0.0547] [0.0352] [0.0298] [0.0484] [0.0570] 
White Collar -0.126 0.0885 0.0814 0.0640 -0.00101 
  [0.0604] [0.0380] [0.0334] [0.0511] [0.0617] 
Age -0.0206 0.0143 0.0139 0.0154 0.00118 
  [0.0289] [0.0197] [0.0176] [0.0183] [0.0114] 
Squared Age 0.000342 -0.000226 -0.000216 -0.000247 -4.28e-05 
  [0.000401] [0.000272] [0.000243] [0.000256] [0.000176] 
Wives'  Age -0.00341 0.00141 0.00108 -0.00193 -8.91e-05 
Management  [0.00579] [0.00394] [0.00353] [0.00362] [0.00190] 
Wife  -0.168 0.114 0.101 0.0964 0.0156 
  [0.0668] [0.0438] [0.0370] [0.0628] [0.0796] 
Price (U) 0.392 -0.0167 -0.0731 -0.335 -0.359 
  [0.0726] [0.0723] [0.0514] [0.122] [0.175] 
Price (M) 0.0282 -0.0206 -0.0167 0.0260 -0.00726 
  [0.0123] [0.0101] [0.00809] [0.0180] [0.0141] 
Price (W) -0.0293 0.169 0.122 -0.0112 -0.115 
  [0.0345] [0.0555] [0.0381] [0.0532] [0.0708] 
Price (T) 0.958 -0.535 -0.564 -0.649 0.220 
  [0.500] [0.765] [0.270] [0.580] [1.179] 
Price (C) -0.200 0.552 0.348 -0.00313 -0.711 
  [0.251] [0.402] [0.178] [0.326] [0.626] 
Beta  -0.262 0.368 0.324 0.114 -0.461 
Intercept [0.229] [0.360] [0.166] [0.292] [0.559] 
Beta Car  -0.464 0.859 0.245 0.222 -0.627 
Owner [0.544] [0.748] [0.284] [0.448] [1.039] 
Beta Home  -0.936 -0.224 -0.0883 0.894 1.226 
Owner [0.507] [0.413] [0.245] [0.336] [0.565] 
Lambda -0.00598 0.0470 0.0327 -0.00992 -0.0530 
  [0.0118] [0.0237] [0.0163] [0.0128] [0.0312] 
Observation 519 
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Table 3.12 Parameter Estimates for Unrestricted Collective Model of Two-
person Households 
  Utility Men Clothes 
Women 
Clothes Transportation Communication 
Intercept -5.21e-07 -1.41e-08 9.52e-08 1.01e-06 -1.28e-07 
  [1.18e-07] [2.00e-08] [3.08e-08] [2.50e-07] [6.80e-08] 
City 0.528 0.0948 -0.0255 -0.476 -0.169 
  [0.0618] [0.117] [0.0464] [0.0529] [0.0885] 
Car  0.0353 0.0454 0.0632 -0.0110 -0.0645 
Ownership [0.0603] [0.0988] [0.0219] [0.0434] [0.123] 
Home  0.0852 -0.0377 0.149 -0.0340 -0.129 
Ownership  [0.0565] [0.110] [0.0415] [0.0588] [0.145] 
Higher  0.333 0.780 0.915 -0.689 -1.904 
Education [0.0644] [0] [0.153] [0.142] [0] 
White Collar  -0.00781 0.0823 0.155 -0.0128 -0.139 
  [0.0615] [0.131] [0.0759] [0.0641] [0] 
Age 0.00137 -0.00759 0.000477 0.0342 -0.00233 
  [0.00881] [0.00376] [0.00368] [0.0165] [0.0115] 
Squared Age 0.00469 0.00640 0.00239 -0.0561 -0.00115 
  [0.00913] [0.00405] [0.00396] [0.0176] [0.0123] 
Wives'  Age -0.919 0.178 -0.750 -4.320 -0.588 
  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Wife  0.807 -0.477 -0.0483 -0.412 -1.771 
Management [0] [0] [0.166] [0] [0] 
Difference in -3.655 -0.629 0.678 7.305 0.552 
Log earnings [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Wife's  -1.806 -0.0689 -0.0894 0.916 0.254 
Income [0.106] [0.209] [0.142] [0] [0] 
Price (U) 0.00210 0.00121 -0.00456 -0.0429 -0.0114 
  [0.00641] [0.00458] [0.00518] [0.0180] [0.00998] 
Price (M) 0.0265 -0.00783 -0.00537 0.0253 -0.0264 
  [0.00896] [0.00464] [0.00622] [0.0239] [0.0146] 
Price (W) -0.000672 -0.00632 0.00271 0.0213 0.0137 
  [0.00738] [0.00409] [0.00563] [0.0265] [0.0154] 
Price (T) -0.000706 -0.000832 -0.00555 -0.0399 -0.00849 
  [0.00436] [0.00253] [0.00313] [0.0139] [0.00751] 
Price (C) 0.00219 0.000682 0.00523 0.00776 -0.00528 
  [0.00434] [0.00252] [0.00319] [0.0147] [0.00761] 
Beta  0.00408 -0.00178 -0.00176 0.00265 -0.00334 
Intercept [0.00295] [0.00175] [0.00206] [0.00889] [0.00504] 
Beta Car  -4.01e-05 2.20e-05 2.26e-05 -7.59e-05 1.11e-05 
Owner [3.94e-05] [2.39e-05] [2.75e-05] [0.000119] [6.71e-05] 
Beta Home  -0.000609 -0.000360 0.000210 0.00348 0.00171 
Owner [0.000612] [0.000354] [0.000488] [0.00199] [0.00106] 
Lambda 0.00390 -0.00485 -0.00821 -0.0324 -0.00939 
  [0.00510] [0.00291] [0.00377] [0.0161] [0.00883] 
Observation 519 
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Table 3.13 Test of the Unitary Model Restrictions 
  Single Females Couples 
Symmetry 6.18 38.01 
  (6) (10) 
  [40.3%] [0%] 
Observation 723 519 
 
Table 3.14 Test for the Collective Model Restrictions 
Test for:   
Symmetry 16.62 
  (10) 
  [8.32%] 
SR1 2.79 
  (3) 
  [42.5%] 
Distribution factor  5.12 
proportionality (3) 
  [16.4%] 
SR1, distribution 2.14 
factor proportionality (4) 
and linearity [71.0%] 
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Table 3.15 Parameter Estimates for Restricted Collective Model of Two-
person Households 
  Utility Men Clothes 
Women 
Clothes Transportation Communication 
Intercept 4.877 0.436 0.210 0.515 -4.767 
  [0] [0.604] [0.544] [1.843] [1.151] 
City 0.595 0.0676 -0.0693 0.978 0.0200 
  [0.687] [0.306] [0.147] [0.614] [0.527] 
Car  -0.416 0.163 0.0142 -0.290 -0.227 
Ownership  [0.232] [0.300] [0.0959] [0.261] [0.424] 
Home  -0.299 0.0415 0.0216 -0.165 -0.134 
Ownership [0.189] [0.214] [0.0649] [0.205] [0.296] 
Higher  2.283 0.0909 -0.273 2.308 0.436 
Education  [0.902] [1.110] [0.413] [0.804] [1.671] 
White Collar  1.372 -0.506 -0.314 1.280 1.552 
  [1.150] [1.692] [0.533] [1.317] [2.279] 
Age 0.00315 -0.00199 0.00267 -0.0104 -0.00492 
  [0.00461] [0.00158] [0.00154] [0.00838] [0.00531] 
Squared Age 0.843 -0.216 -0.134 2.025 0.709 
  [0.294] [0.151] [0.132] [0.476] [0.607] 
Wives'  Age 0.00316 -0.0169 -0.0433 -0.279 -0.0461 
  [0.0455] [0.0281] [0.0269] [0.126] [0.0872] 
Wife  0.0225 -0.0384 -0.0126 0.0710 -0.00249 
Management [0.0282] [0.0184] [0.0160] [0.0491] [0.0522] 
Difference in -1.278 0.747 0.664 -2.312 -1.986 
Log earnings [0.720] [0.407] [0.349] [1.550] [1.437] 
Price (U) -0.0973 -0.0654 -0.0441 0.301 0.411 
  [0.0535] [0.0345] [0.0295] [0.0862] [0.129] 
Price (M) -0.0635 -0.107 -0.119 0.0636 0.357 
  [0.0825] [0.0561] [0.0521] [0.104] [0.174] 
Price (W) 0.0506 -0.0335 -0.00475 -0.00372 -0.0932 
  [0.0462] [0.0335] [0.0262] [0.0668] [0.106] 
Price (T) 0.00836 0.0113 0.00495 -0.0625 -0.0582 
  [0.0150] [0.0110] [0.00776] [0.0425] [0.0589] 
Price (C) -0.0331 -0.0313 -0.0180 0.116 0.163 
  [0.0260] [0.0177] [0.0142] [0.0533] [0.0763] 
Beta  0.0157 0.0117 0.00837 -0.0473 -0.0693 
Intercept [0.0124] [0.00864] [0.00662] [0.0299] [0.0419] 
Beta Car -0.000238 -0.000183 -0.000124 0.000727 0.00107 
Owner [0.000179] [0.000124] [9.74e-05] [0.000411] [0.000575] 
Beta Home  0.00650 0.00451 0.00245 -0.0256 -0.0308 
Owner [0.00444] [0.00287] [0.00238] [0.00783] [0.0119] 
Lambda 0.0158 0.00608 0.00214 -0.0354 -0.0563 
  [0.0166] [0.0124] [0.00866] [0.0494] [0.0674] 
Observation 519 
 
 178 
 
Table 3.16 Parameter Estimates for Unitary Model of Three-person 
Households 
  Utility Men Clothes Women Clothes Transportation Communication 
Intercept -4.025 -0.862 -0.339 0.976 6.967 
  [0.335] [0.650] [0.454] [1.082] [0] 
City -0.0163 0.000796 -0.00275 0.0106 0.0252 
  [0.0251] [0.00616] [0.00381] [0.0186] [0.0497] 
Car  0.369 0.389 0.213 -0.372 -1.699 
Ownership [0.216] [0.182] [0.108] [0.193] [0.705] 
Home  -0.0413 0.000377 0.000102 0.0456 0.0898 
Ownership [0.0278] [0.0110] [0.00730] [0.0327] [0.0629] 
Higher  0.0135 0.00403 0.00234 -0.0106 -0.0321 
Education [0.0128] [0.00362] [0.00229] [0.00978] [0.0265] 
White Collar 0.0244 0.00443 0.000332 -0.0141 -0.0553 
  [0.0129] [0.00539] [0.00363] [0.0109] [0.0270] 
Age 0.0124 0.00355 0.00194 0.000761 -0.0264 
  [0.00758] [0.00261] [0.00173] [0.00589] [0.0156] 
Squared Age -8.01e-05 -3.18e-05 -1.85e-05 -3.24e-05 0.000167 
  [8.85e-05] [2.37e-05] [1.49e-05] [6.49e-05] [0.000182] 
Wives'  Age -0.00492 -0.000779 -0.000423 -0.00125 0.00972 
  [0.00207] [0.000995] [0.000682] [0.00184] [0.00431] 
Wife  -0.0113 0.00254 -0.00131 -0.00694 0.0161 
Management [0.0152] [0.00380] [0.00234] [0.0115] [0.0314] 
Price (U) -0.134 -0.458 -0.257 0.393 1.740 
  [0.260] [0.214] [0.126] [0.297] [0.499] 
Price (M) -0.640 -0.0659 -0.0206 0.0886 0.760 
  [0.296] [0.0937] [0.0604] [0.144] [0.390] 
Price (W) -0.0115 0.00134 0.000220 0.0310 0.0238 
  [0.0102] [0.00486] [0.00362] [0.0197] [0.0231] 
Price (T) 3.507 0.627 0.358 -1.296 -6.099 
  [0.393] [0.585] [0.340] [0.595] [0.480] 
Price (C) 0.734 0.143 0.153 -0.335 -1.545 
  [0.429] [0.256] [0.127] [0.218] [0.887] 
Beta Intercept 0.344 0.0845 0.0932 -0.187 -0.799 
  [0.315] [0.138] [0.0779] [0.132] [0.607] 
Beta Car  -1.210 -0.591 -0.484 0.944 3.030 
Owner [0.512] [0.430] [0.159] [0.401] [1.196] 
Beta Home  -5.816 -1.245 -0.934 2.759 11.25 
Owner [0.378] [1.147] [0.590] [0.882] [0] 
Lambda 2.517 -0.270 -0.216 -0.121 -1.069 
  [0] [0.309] [0.201] [0.504] [0.834] 
Observation 511 
 
 
 179 
Table 3.17 Parameter Estimates for Unrestricted Collective Model of 
Three-person Households 
  Utility Men Clothes 
Women 
Clothes Transportation Communication 
Intercept 1.351 -0.198 -0.266 -0.118 -0.0657 
  [0] [0.326] [0.221] [0.470] [0.755] 
City 1.832 1.302 0.569 -1.437 -4.126 
  [0.287] [0.413] [0.227] [0.492] [0.366] 
Car  0.831 0.325 0.214 -0.313 -1.603 
Ownership  [0.259] [0.319] [0.133] [0.199] [0.609] 
Home  0.400 0.0851 0.0993 -0.0940 -0.667 
Ownership  [0.196] [0.180] [0.0911] [0.106] [0.438] 
Higher  -0.807 -0.137 -0.359 0.727 1.118 
Education  [0.333] [0.453] [0.136] [0.326] [0.905] 
White Collar  -3.089 -2.095 -1.072 2.004 7.612 
  [0.335] [0.721] [0.375] [0.649] [0] 
Age 0.0136 -0.0117 -0.00456 0.00584 0.0241 
  [0.00967] [0.00344] [0.00253] [0.0136] [0.00949] 
Squared Age -0.0298 0.0184 0.0131 -0.00944 -0.0329 
  [0.0106] [0.00377] [0.00278] [0.0148] [0.0104] 
Wives'  Age -3.311 -1.712 -0.827 0.837 6.211 
  [0.348] [0.677] [0.457] [0.598] [0] 
Wife  -0.348 -0.0230 0.0769 -0.427 0.339 
Management [0.271] [0.172] [0.0902] [0.196] [0.429] 
Difference in -0.322 -0.0297 -0.0470 0.199 0.498 
Log earnings [0.242] [0.141] [0.0861] [0.143] [0.386] 
Wife's  -1.828 -0.779 -0.408 1.782 1.713 
Income  [0.279] [0.441] [0.292] [0.904] [0] 
Price (U) -0.0474 -0.00988 -0.00542 0.00973 0.0888 
  [0.0193] [0.00783] [0.00517] [0.0200] [0.0328] 
Price (M) 0.0201 0.0299 0.0296 -0.0301 -0.0834 
  [0.0354] [0.0484] [0.0235] [0.0400] [0.0976] 
Price (W) -0.00713 0.0358 0.0132 0.0192 -0.0181 
  [0.0245] [0.0351] [0.0144] [0.0266] [0.0737] 
Price (T) -0.000338 0.000657 0.00141 -0.00405 -0.00138 
  [0.00817] [0.00351] [0.00213] [0.00771] [0.0161] 
Price (C) 0.0239 0.00704 -0.000745 -0.0148 -0.0514 
  [0.00901] [0.00605] [0.00375] [0.00952] [0.0189] 
Beta  0.00441 0.00210 0.00111 0.00380 -0.00809 
Intercept [0.00485] [0.00209] [0.00127] [0.00462] [0.00945] 
Beta Car  -1.75e-05 -2.20e-05 -1.62e-05 -5.39e-05 3.13e-05 
Owner  [5.63e-05] [2.28e-05] [1.36e-05] [5.30e-05] [0.000109] 
Beta Home  -0.00164 -0.000230 -3.44e-05 -0.00225 0.00229 
Owner [0.00132] [0.000661] [0.000415] [0.00136] [0.00261] 
Lambda -0.0107 0.00507 0.00119 -0.00759 0.0116 
  [0.0101] [0.00414] [0.00249] [0.00956] [0.0196] 
Observation 511 
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Table 3.18 Test of the Unitary Model Restrictions 
  Three-person Households 
Symmetry 195.71 
  (10) 
  [0.00%] 
Observation 511 
 
Table 3.19 Test for the Collective Model Restrictions 
Test for:   
Symmetry 9.17 
  (10) 
  [51.56%] 
SR1 2.12 
  (3) 
  [54.83%] 
Distribution factor  3.45 
Proportionality (4) 
  [48.52%] 
SR1, distribution 6.02 
factor proportionality (9) 
and linearity [73.77%] 
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 Table 3.20 Parameter Estimates for Restricted Collective Model of Three-
person Households 
  Utility Men Clothes 
Women 
Clothes Transportation Communication 
Intercept 0.873 -0.985 -0.793 0.0924 1.906 
  [1.337] [0.535] [0.444] [0.781] [0] 
City 2.727 1.719 0.786 -1.608 -5.837 
  [0.453] [0.438] [0.254] [0.570] [0.488] 
Car  1.399 0.738 0.427 -0.526 -2.907 
Ownership  [0.304] [0.453] [0.204] [0.256] [0.797] 
Home  0.694 0.331 0.226 -0.213 -1.404 
Ownership [0.226] [0.253] [0.148] [0.124] [0.565] 
Higher  -1.124 -0.547 -0.481 0.896 2.142 
Education  [0.423] [0.471] [0.145] [0.358] [0.994] 
White Collar  -5.110 -3.358 -1.730 2.760 11.88 
  [0.524] [0.898] [0.498] [0.810] [0] 
Age -0.0105 0.00313 0.00604 -0.00129 -0.00218 
  [0.00465] [0.00165] [0.00122] [0.00650] [0.00454] 
Squared Age -3.465 -2.184 -1.174 1.107 7.430 
  [0.369] [0.631] [0.422] [0.524] [0] 
Wives'  Age -0.413 -0.103 0.0231 -0.223 0.543 
  [0.353] [0.195] [0.106] [0.179] [0.607] 
Wife  -0.287 -0.0814 -0.0589 0.218 0.513 
Management  [0.210] [0.124] [0.0790] [0.107] [0.364] 
Difference in -2.327 -0.892 -0.397 1.534 2.672 
Log earnings [0.735] [0.478] [0.300] [1.042] [1.503] 
Price (U) -0.0486 -0.00878 -0.00503 0.00720 0.0884 
  [0.0231] [0.00839] [0.00527] [0.0204] [0.0432] 
Price (M) 0.0580 0.0534 0.0439 -0.0232 -0.173 
  [0.0521] [0.0578] [0.0291] [0.0435] [0.144] 
Price (W) -0.00231 0.0350 0.0180 0.0249 -0.0231 
  [0.0314] [0.0356] [0.0169] [0.0266] [0.0884] 
Price (T) -0.000349 0.00261 0.00274 -0.00590 -0.00350 
  [0.00949] [0.00370] [0.00219] [0.00882] [0.0187] 
Price (C) 0.0282 0.00824 -0.000797 -0.0174 -0.0620 
  [0.0114] [0.00781] [0.00483] [0.0120] [0.0242] 
Beta  0.00786 0.00380 0.00173 0.00261 -0.0162 
Intercept [0.00567] [0.00262] [0.00161] [0.00552] [0.0112] 
Beta Car  -4.83e-05 -3.73e-05 -2.23e-05 -4.67e-05 0.000101 
Owner [6.59e-05] [2.57e-05] [1.53e-05] [6.12e-05] [0.000128] 
Beta Home  -0.00255 -0.000464 -5.73e-05 -0.00212 0.00421 
Owner [0.00153] [0.000843] [0.000535] [0.00164] [0.00308] 
Lambda -0.0129 0.00474 0.00135 -0.00588 0.0163 
  [0.0116] [0.00446] [0.00264] [0.0109] [0.0227] 
Observation 511 
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6. Conclusion 
In the above, a general characterization of the collective model was 
presented. Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), it was shown that the 
collective model can be completely captured by using a household utility 
function )(⋅u  that depends on household purchases q  and a distribution index 
µ . If the latter is a constant then the usual unitary model can be applied. 
However, generally the function )(⋅µ  depends on prices p , total expenditure 
x , and distribution factors y . The fact that all non-preference influences have 
to act through this index puts stronger restrictions on household consumption 
behavior. In Sections 2 and 3 these restrictions were explained.  
In Sections 4 and 5, the parameters of a demand system were 
estimated and then some of the predictions of the unitary and collective 
models were tested. Although minimal assumptions in the theory section were 
made, stronger assumptions needed to be made in this empirical work. For 
example, it was assumed that preferences for the nondurables modeled are 
separable from other goods except for the ownership of a house or car. It was 
also assumed that the labor supply decision is exogenous to the demand 
system. Conditional on these reservations the results were unambiguous: the 
predictions of the unitary model were not rejected for single-person 
households but they were rejected for two-person households. The predictions 
of the collective model were not rejected for two-person households. This 
indicated that the collective setting is worth further investigation.  
In Section 4, the characteristics of the data were also discussed. The 
JPSC included the data of income distribution both by item and membership. 
This shows the change of household behavior among different generations 
and at different times. The share of expenditure on essential goods such as 
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food and utilities seemed stable across generations and years. On the other 
hand, the expenditure on unessential goods such as clothing or means of 
communication fluctuated across generations. In general, young households 
tended to spend more on those unessential goods. This can indicate that the 
preference might change from generation to generation. Regarding the income 
allocation among members of households in two-person households, the 
share of consumption for husbands occupies an extremely large portion of 
total expenditure. This can be partly due to the bias of respondees. The 
questionnaires are distributed to females so wives fill out the form in two-
person households. According to Vardharajan (2005), the responses between 
wives and husbands might be different in the consumption for themselves. The 
underestimation of the expenditure for wives could happen to this survey and 
the share of the expenditure for their husbands might have been 
overestimated. 
The data set also includes a survey on the types of income 
management. They categorize the income management into 16 types which 
can be divided into three groups. One is households where wives managed 
the household income. Another is those where husbands controlled the 
income. The final group was husbands and wives who managed the incomes 
individually. Among all the samples, the households managed by wives 
occupied most of observations. However, as for those where both husbands 
and wives have their own jobs, there were some households which belonged 
to either the husband-management type or the individual management type. In 
section 5, the wife-management dummy variable was included in the function 
of the collective model for two-person households. 
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In Section 5, first it was examined whether the unitary model fits single-
person households and two-person households. The results show that it could 
not be rejected that the consumption behavior of one-person households 
followed the unitary model. However, the data on two-person households 
rejected that the unitary model could explain their behavior. Then the analyses 
about whether the collective model could be applied to two-person households 
were undertaken. The test for SR1, distribution factor proportionality and 
linearity indicated that it could not be rejected that the two-person model 
explained the income allocation of two-person households. The restricted 
collective model was also estimated and it showed that the total income 
played an important role in the model. 
At the end of Section 5, the data of three-person households was used 
and it was checked whether the collective model of two-person households 
could be applied to three-person households. As a result, it could not be 
rejected that the three-person model could be represented by the two-person 
collective model. Therefore, it should be necessary to study the collective 
model for multi-person households further since it might be possible that the 
model is difficult to extend to the households consisting of more than two 
members.            
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APPENDIX 
 
This annex has tables which represent the characteristics of the JPSC.  
Table 3.A.1 show the income management type of the all samples who were 
married. Table 3.A.2-3.A.4 show the monthly income by management type of 
all samples. Then, Table 3.A.5-3.A.7 deal with the monthly allowance and 
pooled budget in households. Last three tables represent the change of 
income management type over time. These data has very important 
information although they were not used in the analyses directly this time.  
 
 
Table 3.A.1 Distribution of Income Management Type 
Type 
1998 
(%) 
2001 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
A 11.78 10.45 10.19 
B 37.26 34.01 32.04 
C 20.12 22.71 25.30 
D 1.41 2.13 2.59 
E 6.68 8.53 8.81 
F 3.87 4.58 3.20 
G 2.37 2.45 2.76 
H 2.81 3.09 4.58 
I  2.55 2.88 3.02 
J 2.64 3.30 2.94 
K 1.49 1.07 0.95 
L 0.35 0.43 0.69 
Others 6.68 4.38 2.94 
Total 100 100 100 
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Table 3.A.2 Monthly Income by Management Type in 1998 
  Mean SD Min Max 
A 325.15 139.83 64.99 969.99 
B 326.77 139.14 72.75 1163.99 
C 365.67 132.66 129.01 969.99 
D 379.08 131.52 194.00 598.48 
E 373.84 147.38 87.30 892.39 
F 342.52 117.61 116.40 584.90 
G 375.28 202.26 174.60 1242.56 
H 366.17 160.01 145.50 793.45 
I 384.38 160.74 126.10 708.09 
J 363.46 168.84 116.40 899.18 
K 335.50 129.22 116.40 523.79 
L 341.19 114.82 232.80 444.26 
Others 326.22 230.56 15.52 1600.48 
 
Table 3.A.3 Monthly Income by Management Type in 2001 
  Mean SD Min Max 
A 369.19 196.72 98.72 1665.39 
B 335.19 133.58 50.35 991.14 
C 406.88 151.21 138.21 1187.59 
D 372.91 114.52 216.20 632.79 
E 376.58 136.66 167.82 750.27 
F 373.69 146.78 127.35 789.75 
G 392.73 162.41 162.89 740.39 
H 364.51 173.04 138.21 847.01 
I 391.92 179.81 78.98 792.72 
J 332.87 141.68 92.80 567.64 
K 344.43 142.94 138.21 641.67 
L 544.93 203.17 325.77 815.42 
Others 337.30 180.71 116.49 854.91 
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Table 3.A.4 Monthly Income by Management Type in 2003 
  Mean SD Min Max 
A 345.86 154.02 80.16 881.76 
B 347.33 153.80 90.18 1252.50 
C 417.40 167.25 133.27 1366.73 
D 425.12 163.86 170.34 981.96 
E 409.52 181.46 110.22 1108.21 
F 428.10 173.41 100.20 1002.00 
G 400.30 190.37 120.24 945.89 
H 407.66 155.22 140.28 829.66 
I 375.89 208.07 130.26 1137.27 
J 406.19 202.17 145.29 1007.01 
K 414.46 100.78 250.50 601.20 
L 361.22 192.64 50.10 713.42 
Others 262.32 172.98 40.08 796.59 
 
 
Table 3.A.5 Share of Wives’ Allowance and Husbands’ Contribution 
to the Pool to Monthly Income  
 
1998 
Share of Allowance 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 33 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.35 
B 39 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.22 
C 61 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.18 
F 9 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.15 
I 28 0.49 0.43 0.03 1.72 
K 17 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.96 
Share of Pool 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 129 0.55 0.33 0.03 1.95 
D (Wife) 15 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.59 
F 41 0.46 0.25 0.09 1.03 
G 32 0.53 0.29 0.07 1.03 
G (Wife) 27 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.72 
H 25 0.47 0.22 0.07 0.84 
I 28 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.73 
I (Wife) 28 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.61 
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2001 
Share of Allowance 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 18 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.37 
B 44 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.20 
C 42 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.36 
F 8 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.16 
I 31 0.29 0.26 0.04 0.96 
K 10 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.37 
Share of Pool 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 98 0.55 0.31 0.00 1.44 
D (Wife) 20 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.93 
F 42 0.46 0.25 0.06 1.01 
G 28 0.56 0.32 0.14 1.50 
G (Wife) 23 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.45 
H 23 0.40 0.19 0.07 0.78 
I 26 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.72 
I (Wife) 25 0.22 0.23 0.00 1.01 
 
 
2003 
Share of Allowance 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 27 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.20 
B 48 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.23 
C 77 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.20 
F 4 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.20 
I 34 0.34 0.30 0.03 1.00 
K 11 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.34 
Share of Pool 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 116 0.48 0.31 0.00 1.14 
D (Wife) 30 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.81 
F 36 0.46 0.24 0.11 1.27 
G 53 0.42 0.25 0.04 0.93 
G (Wife) 32 0.24 0.16 0.03 0.58 
H 32 0.40 0.18 0.12 0.84 
I 31 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.62 
I (Wife) 32 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.57 
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Table 3.A.6 Change in the Management Types over time 
1998-2001 
Type A B C D E F G H I J K L Others 
A 56.70 17.53 5.15 1.03 1.03 7.22 2.06 4.12 2.06 1.03 1.03 0.00 0.00 
B 4.46 61.31 13.69 1.49 9.23 1.19 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.19 0.60 0.89 3.27 
C 1.75 15.20 62.57 1.17 5.85 2.92 0.00 1.75 0.58 2.92 0.58 0.00 4.09 
D 0.00 15.38 23.08 30.77 7.69 0.00 0.00 7.69 7.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.69 
E 3.70 18.52 18.52 3.70 46.30 0.00 0.00 3.70 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.85 
F 3.13 12.50 15.63 0.00 3.13 31.25 12.50 9.38 9.38 3.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
G 10.53 0.00 15.79 0.00 0.00 21.05 31.58 10.53 5.26 5.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H 16.00 8.00 0.00 4.00 8.00 16.00 4.00 40.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I 10.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 
J 8.00 12.00 24.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 24.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 
K 7.14 21.43 7.14 0.00 7.14 7.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 28.57 7.14 0.00 
L 0.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Others 2.27 22.73 27.27 4.55 0.00 11.36 4.55 2.27 9.09 6.82 0.00 0.00 9.09 
 
2001-2003 
Type A B C D E F G H I J K L Others 
A 56.58 18.42 2.63 1.32 3.95 1.32 3.95 10.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.32 
B 5.76 55.14 21.81 2.06 5.76 2.06 0.41 1.23 0.41 2.47 0.82 0.00 1.65 
C 0.63 11.25 65.63 2.50 6.88 1.25 0.63 2.50 0.00 2.50 1.25 0.63 3.13 
D 0.00 26.32 21.05 31.58 5.26 0.00 0.00 5.26 0.00 10.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
E 1.49 14.93 25.37 5.97 38.81 4.48 1.49 2.99 1.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.99 
F 5.41 2.70 21.62 0.00 0.00 29.73 10.81 10.81 2.70 5.41 2.70 2.70 0.00 
G 12.50 0.00 12.50 0.00 6.25 12.50 31.25 6.25 6.25 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H 0.00 4.35 13.04 0.00 8.70 17.39 8.70 34.78 13.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I 4.76 9.52 4.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.76 9.52 42.86 14.29 0.00 4.76 0.00 
J 10.00 10.00 35.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 15.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
K 33.33 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 
L 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 
Others 6.25 18.75 43.75 0.00 6.25 0.00 6.25 0.00 6.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 
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1998-2003 
Type A B C D E F G H I J K L Others 
A 46.07 19.10 4.49 1.12 4.49 4.49 5.62 7.87 2.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.25 
B 5.07 46.74 26.09 1.81 9.78 1.45 0.36 2.17 0.00 1.45 0.72 0.36 3.26 
C 2.08 10.42 66.67 3.47 6.25 2.78 0.69 2.78 1.39 0.69 0.00 0.69 1.39 
D 9.09 9.09 36.36 36.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
E 4.65 18.60 16.28 6.98 41.86 2.33 0.00 6.98 2.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F 4.00 8.00 24.00 0.00 4.00 32.00 4.00 8.00 12.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 
G 0.00 10.00 15.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 35.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
H 12.00 8.00 4.00 0.00 8.00 16.00 12.00 28.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 
I 7.14 7.14 28.57 0.00 7.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.71 7.14 0.00 7.14 0.00 
J 8.70 13.04 13.04 0.00 8.70 8.70 0.00 8.70 4.35 21.74 8.70 0.00 4.35 
K 20.00 10.00 30.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 10.00 
L 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Others 13.51 10.81 35.14 5.41 2.70 2.70 2.70 2.70 0.00 18.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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